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RENEWABLE ENERGY AND THE NEIGHBORS
Troy A. Rule*
I. INTRODUCTION
The greatest opponents of renewable energy development are often those
living next door. Many landowners view wind turbines and solar panels as threats
to local aesthetics and property values.' As a result, zoning ordinances and
subdivision covenants in communities throughout the country restrict or prohibit
the installation of green energy devices.2
Recent policy developments in the United States evince strong general
support for "distributed renewables"-rooftop solar panels, small wind turbines, 3
and similar systems that generate electric power for on-site use.4 Generous federal
*C
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' Neighborhood conflicts over small renewable energy systems have become a regular
occurrence in recent years. See, e.g., Richard Cowen, Wayne Man's Wind Turbine in

Judge's Hands, RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 28, 2010, at L3 (describing a dispute between a
landowner and the local planning board over a proposal to install a fifty-foot-high wind
turbine atop the landowner's commercial car wash facility); Bob Goldsborough, Naperville
Takes Wind Out of Turbine Plan; Carwash'sEnergy ProposalDelayed Until City's Ready,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 3, 2010, at 9 (describing local government's decision to
indefinitely table a landowner's proposal to install a forty-five-foot-tall small wind
turbine); Catherine Saillant, Solar Panels Causing Some Storms, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2009, at A4 (describing disputes between landowners and homeowner associations over
rooftop solar panels); Kate Galbraith, Homeowners Associations: The Enemy of Solar?,
N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2009, 8:15 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/
homeowners-associationsthe-enemy-of-solar/ (describing a homeowner association's
opposition to solar panel installations).
2 For a more detailed discussion of local barriers to distributed renewable energy
development, see infra text accompanying notes 73-84, 89-90.
3 Small wind turbines are sometimes distinguished from building-mounted turbines,

which tend to be smaller and are mounted on existing structures. For the purposes of this
Article, "small wind turbines" refers to both building-mounted turbines and conventional
tower-mounted turbines, all typically having generating capacities of one hundred kilowatts
or less. See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY:
YEAR ENDING 2009, at 17 (2010) [hereinafter AWEA, 2009 SMALL WIND MARKET
STUDY], availableat http://www.awea.org/documents/2010_AWEASmallWindTurbine
_Global MarketStudy.pdf (describing building-mounted turbines).
4 "Distributed" renewable energy development is distinguishable from commercial
renewable energy development, which involves the siting and installation of industrial-
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subsidies have significantly defrayed the cost of distributed renewables, and
incentive programs in dozens of states further encourage landowners to invest in
the devices.
Unfortunately, Americans tend to be far less supportive when distributed
renewables are proposed for installation on a neighboring lot or just down the
street.7 Even municipalities that have embraced green building standards and other
sustainable land use practices often disfavor local policies that promote distributed
renewable energy.
Communities' reluctance to accommodate distributed renewables raises
difficult questions over how best to allocate land use regulatory authority between
states and local governments. Statutes in a growing minority of states overcome
community opposition to distributed renewables by broadly invalidating local land
use controls that restrict their installation.9 Such broad legislation succeeds at
tearing down local barriers to distributed renewable energy but can ignore
legitimate concerns that drive community resistance. Distributed renewable energy is vital to curbing energy sprawl'o by largescale energy generation facilities while still reducing the nation's reliance on fossil
fuels." As small-scale wind and solar power systems grow ever more costefficient, neighborhood battles over them will only increase. Innovative laws are

scale renewable energy generating systems for the production of power that is typically
sold on a wholesale basis for use offsite. Commercial wind or solar energy projects are also
prone to local opposition but present their own set of distinct issues that are outside the
scope of this article.
5 See generally 26 U.S.C. § 25D (2006) (providing a 30% federal income tax credit on
the installation of solar panels, small wind turbines, and certain other renewable energy
devices).
6
DATABASE
OF
ST.
INCENTIVES
FOR
RENEWABLES
& EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2010) (providing state-by-state information
on state-level incentives for renewable energy).
7 See supra note 1.
8See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 83.
9 State legislation aimed at preempting or invalidating local restrictions on distributed
renewable energy is described in more detail in Part III.E of this Article.
to Professor Bronin recently authored an article on the issue of "energy sprawl,"
which she defines as the "ever-increasing consumption of land, particularly in rural areas,
required to site energy generation facilities." Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl, 43
CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2010), available at http://ssm.com/ abstract-1594515
(discussing energy sprawl and the critical importance of distributed renewable energy to
addressing this growing problem).
" Other legal scholars have emphasized the growing and crucial role of distributed
renewable energy to the nation's energy future. See, e.g., Garrick B. Pursley & Hannah J.
Wiseman, Local Energy, 60 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming Mar.-Apr. 2011) (manuscript at 6),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1567585 ("Distributed renewables . . . are just as
essential as large-scale installations to establishing a stable nationwide energy
infrastructure powered substantially by renewable resources .... ).
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needed to prevent local opposition from hindering the future growth of distributed
renewable energy.
This Article analyzes distributed renewable energy from the perspective of
communities, proposing a new strategy for making it more attractive at the local
level. Part II of the Article suggests that fears of adverse effects on home values
are a primary reason why land use laws favoring distributed renewables often
garner less local support than other sustainability-driven land use policies. Part III
analyzes existing state and federal efforts to overcome community resistance,
concluding that none of them effectively mitigates neighborhood opposition
without forfeiting the valuable benefits of local land use decisionmaking. Part IV
frames governmental powers to regulate land use as scarce "entitlements" within
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's model of property rules and liability
rules. Part IV also explores the possibility of using liability rule-like approaches to
promote more efficient allocations of these powers between state and local
governments. Part V proposes a statutory scheme that would award special
property tax credits to landowners in communities that have voluntarily amended
their land use regulations to allow distributed renewables. This "Green Community
Tax Credit" approach would encourage communities to accommodate distributed
renewables, yet allow each community to weigh its unique local costs and
independently decide the issue.
II. THE LOCAL EcONOMICS OF SUSTAINABILITY
Renewable energy devices are just one component of the global, decades-old
sustainability movement. "Sustainable development" is development that "meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their 'own needs."' 2 Originating in a 1983 U.N. World Commission on
Environment and Development report," the phrase has become a popular catchall
for ecological, energy-efficient land use practices.14 Suburban growth boundaries,
12

Jerrold A. Long, Sustainability Starts Locally: Untying the Hands of Local

Governments to Create Sustainable Communities, 10 Wyo. L. REv. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting
U.N. World Comm'n on Env't & Dev., Our Common Future: Report of the World
Commission on Environmentand Development, U.N. Doc. A/42/427 (May 21, 1987)).
13 Id. Long mentions that sustainable development was originally intended to
encompass economic and social equity components. Id. Although the common usage of
sustainable development connotes an emphasis on environmental sustainability, some
scholars have called for greater attention to these other two components. See, e.g., Patricia

E. Salkin, Sustainability and Land Use Planning: Greening State and Local Land Use
Plans and Regulations to Address Climate Change Challenges and PreserveResourcesfor
Future Generations, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L & POL'Y. REv. 121, 131-32 (2009)
("While not as commonly associated with sustainability, the provision of an adequate
supply of affordable housing is central to the social equity component of sustainability.").
14 The U.N. Commission's broad conception of sustainable development has drawn
criticism for its vagueness. Cf Long, supra note 12, at 6 ("I am sick to death of hearing
about sustainable development. What is it? What do I do about it? How do I make it
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green building standards, renewable energy incentive programs, development
density requirements, and programs for the preservation of trees and open space
are all classifiable as sustainable land use policies.
Mounting fears of climate change and growing frustration with suburban
sprawl have triggered a surge of popular interest in sustainable land use in recent
years. 5 Sustainable development practices reduce the country's dependency on
fossil fuels and help curb carbon dioxide emissions. In an era of fierce global trade
competition, sustainability policies are also increasingly viewed as a source of new
domestic jobs16 and a means of safeguarding the nation's economic position.17
A. Sustainabilityand the "Homevoter"

Although sustainable land use arguably offers valuable national and global
benefits, not all sustainable development practices are equally appealing at the
local level. Some sustainable land use policies can enrich a community's most
influential landowners, while other policies threaten to have the opposite effect.
Discussions about how to promote sustainable land use often fail to clearly
distinguish those policies that are likely to garner neighborhood-level support from
those that are not. State and federal strategies for promoting sustainable
development will be most effective if they reflect the distinctly local interests and
pressures that drive most land use decisions.
Sustainable development requires novel approaches to land use permits,
building codes, and urban planning-all of which have historically fallen primarily
happen? What am I supposed to tell my client to do, or not to do? I need answers to those
questions, and am not finding them in law review articles, policy papers, and engineering
journals. Don't talk to me about sustainable development until you have the answers."
(quoting J.B. Ruhl, The Seven Degrees of Relevance: Why Should Real-World
Environmental Attorneys Care Now About Sustainable Development Policy?, 8 DUKE
ENVTL. L. &POL'Y F. 273, 274 (1998))).
15 Cf John R. Nolon, The Land Use Stabilization Wedge Strategy: Shifting Ground to
Mitigate Climate Change, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 1, 10-12 (2009)
(describing the many costly and unsustainable characteristics of the "single-family
settlement pattern" that has predominated development in the United States since World
War H).
16 For example, in 2009, U.S. colleges and universities created more than one hundred
new majors, minors, and certificates in the area of energy and sustainability. See Julie
Schmit, As Colleges Add Green Studies, Classes Fill; And Employers Look Forward to
New Hires, USA TODAY, Dec. 28, 2009, at B 1.
17 For instance, China is aggressively integrating sustainability into its policymaking,
and other nations (including the United States) are struggling to keep pace in burgeoning
renewable energy industries. See Keith Bradsher, China Leading Race to Make Clean
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at Al ("China vaulted past competitors in Denmark,
Germany, Spain and the United States last year to become the world's largest maker of
wind turbines, and is poised to expand even further this year. China has also leapfrogged
the West in the last two years to emerge as the world's largest manufacturer of solar
panels.").
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under the control of municipalities and private community associations. Cities,
counties, and homeowner associations are the primary regulators of land use in the
United States.18 Municipal governments derive their land use authority primarily
from the state delegation of police powers.19 Most states have empowered the local
governments within their jurisdictions to regulate land use by enacting versions of
the State Zoning Enabling Act. 20 The vast majority of states have also implicitly
granted land use regulatory authority to many of their cities and counties by
affording them home rule status. 2 1 In the past few decades, state-level regulation of
land use has increased to address environmental concerns, 22 which also falls within

18 For

a history of local government involvement in land use regulation, see Sara C.

Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: SustainableDesign, Land Use Regulation, and the

States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 235-38 (2008). Bronin cites work by Professors Richard
Briffault, Carol Rose, and Dan Turlock, asserting that most scholars support the "locality of
land use regulation." Id. at 235.
19 It is generally accepted that land use regulation bearing a substantial relation to the
public health, safety, or welfare, falls within the scope of the police power. See Vill. of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
20 See Long, supra note 12, at 17-18 (stating that the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act empowers local governments to "regulate and restrict" numerous aspects of land use
and development within their boundaries "for the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals, or the general welfare of the community" (quoting ADVISORY COMM. ON CITY
PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING
ACT: UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS § 1 (1926)). The
Standard Zoning Enabling Act largely remains in effect in forty-seven states. Id. at 17 n.78;
I NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW 490 (3d
ed. 2003).
21 According to one commentator, as of 2003, forty-eight states were considered
"home rule" states. See WILLIAM VALENTE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 254 (5th ed. 2001). However, the extent of authority conveyed
to home rule municipalities concededly varies by state, and in some states not all types of
municipal entities enjoy home rule autonomy. Id. For a thorough examination of issues
raised by home rule, see generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 2257, 2260 (2003) ("[A]ll but two states now have express constitutional or statutory
home rule provisions.").
22
See ENVTL. LAW INST., NEW GROUND: THE ADVENT OF LOCAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 172 (John R. Nolon ed., 2003) [hereinafter NOLON, NEW GROUND] (claiming that an
increased interest in environmental issues motivated several states in the 1970s and 1980s
to make "significant modifications to their systems of land use control, giving more power
to the regional and state governments to deal with environmental protection through land
use controls"). This reclamation of land use power by state governments was coined the
"quiet revolution" in a book bearing that phrase in 1971. See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID
CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971); Bronin, supra note 18,
at 267 (arguing that the quiet revolution never fully materialized and advocating its revival
as a means of promoting sustainability).

HeinOnline -- 2010 Utah L. Rev. 1227 2010

1228

[No. 4

UTAH LAW REVIEW

the scope of the state's police power.23 Nonetheless, local governments still retain
the lion's share of land use regulatory authority. In recent years, homeowner
associations have also become increasingly important regulators of land use.24
Communities may derive their land use regulatory authority from the state,
but they tend to formulate land use policies with distinctly local interests in mind.
Professor William Fischel's Homevoter Hypothesis posits that "concern for home
values is the central motivator of local government behavior." 25 A home is often a
voter's most valuable and highly leveraged asset, and land use regulations can
greatly impact the market values of homes within a jurisdiction.26 Homeowners
thus "tend to choose those policies that preserve or increase the value of their
homes," recognizing that the package of taxes and public amenities that
accompanies. a home is capitalized into its value.2 7 Professor Fischel suggests that
these "homevoters" are often a community's most influential voterS28 and that they
tend to favor policies that protect local home values even if alternative policies

23

See

PETER W. SALSICH, JR.,

& TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI,

424
(2d ed. 2003) ("Both environmental protection and land use regulation powers are derived
LAND USE REGULATION

from the police power of the state to protect public health, safety and welfare.").
24 As of 2009, an estimated 60.1 million Americans lived in housing governed by
homeowner associations and there were approximately 305,400 homeowner associationgoverned communities in the United States. See Industry Data: National Statistics,
COMMUNITY Ass'Ns INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx (last
visited July 13, 2010).
25 WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 5
(2001).
26 Decades of empirical research have affirmatively established
that land use

regulations can materially affect property values. In Fischel's words:
It is an undergraduate exercise these days. Find a sample of single-family
housing values, either individual transactions or census tract averages. Regress
their value against a number of control variables-square feet of living space,

number of rooms, age of structure, access to amenities or disamenities-and add
a variable or two to capture the effect of some local government policy that
varies within the sample. The results of this exercise show . . . that local

government policies do indeed make a difference.
WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 219 (1995)
(citing JOHN A. YINGER ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND HOUSE VALUES: THE THEORY AND
ESTIMATION OF INTRAJURISDICTIONAL PROPERTY TAX CAPITALIZATION (1988)).
27 FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 4. Fischel's homevoter-based conception of local politics
is in stark contrast to the conventional view of state-level policymaking, where special
interest groups tend to have a greater influence on legislative decisions. See id. at 206
("[C]oncentrated interest groups with much to gain from development would seem more
likely to be served at the state level.").
28 Fischel has cited multiple empirical sources and studies in support of his assertion
that "[h]omeowners are clearly the dominant political faction in the communities in which
the great majority of Americans reside" and that the "prospect of capital gains and losses to
homeowners is the most consistent motivator of local government activity." Id. at 96.
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would better enhance the broader social welfare. 29 Focused on the communityspecific costs and benefits that predominate in their constituents' minds, local
governments often pay less attention to the regional, national, or global effects of
land use decisions.3 0
The community-centric nature of local land use policy has important
implications for state or federal policymaking aimed at promoting sustainable land
use. Few municipal governments would voluntarily increase local taxes if they
knew that 99% of the additional tax revenue raised would flow directly to the
federal government. For similar reasons, most communities are reluctant to incur
substantial new costs to support a sustainable development strategy whose benefits
would flow primarily outside their jurisdictional boundaries.
Distributed renewable energy is less likely than many other sustainable land
use practices to garner local political support. The following subsections attempt to
categorize various sustainable land use policies based on their relative propensities
for community acceptance, labeling the policies as "homevoter-favored,"
"homevoter-neutral," or "homevoter-feared." Such sorting is somewhat
oversimplified, but it helps to illustrate why distributed renewable energy devices
are more susceptible to local resistance than most other forms of sustainable
development.

Michelman has written about the often community-centric character of local
government policymaking, describing a "public choice" model of local government in
which voters and local officials are primarily self-interested. See Frank I. Michelman,
29

PoliticalMarkets and Community Self-Determination: Competing JudicialModels ofLocal
Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-50 (1978). He contrasts this "public choice"

conception of local government with a "public interest" model (under which officials might
focus more on maximizing the net social benefit of land use policies), conceding that the
public interest model may in a sense be a "less 'realistic' way of looking at the world than
public choice." See id.
30 Rockland County, New York, has even expressly mandated community-centric
cost/benefit analyses of development projects, authorizing the waiver of LEED certification
requirements upon a determination by a county executive that "the benefits of waiving this
local law's requirements outweigh the environmental benefits to the residents of Rockland
County." Patricia E. Salkin, Renewable Energy and Land Use Regulation (PartI), ALIABA Bus. L. COURSE MATERIALS J., Feb. 2010, at 47, 53 (quoting CNTY. OF ROCKLAND,
N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 14, § 3 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
31 Not surprisingly, other scholars have observed this reluctance of local governments
to adopt policies for the primary benefit of those outside the jurisdiction. See, e.g., Amnon
Lehavi, IntergovernmentalLiability Rules, 92 VA. L. REv. 929, 931 (2006) (arguing that
when a locality's land use decision "has substantial implications on private and public
actors outside its territory, the local government has no apparent political motive to
consider these effects in advance, let alone to consciously forego intrajurisdictional benefits
to prevent interjurisdictional harms").
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B. Homevoter-FavoredSustainability

Some sustainable land use policies substantially benefit a community's most
influential voters. These homevoter-favored policies restrict or increase the cost of
new real estate development, bolstering the market values of developed properties
within a jurisdiction.32
Several sustainable land use strategies directly or indirectly restrict real estate
development. One aggressive growth-restricting policy is a growth boundary-a
line drawn near the edge of an urban area beyond which new development within
the jurisdiction is prohibited or highly restricted. Growth boundaries and other
aggressive "smart growth" 34 strategies are typically advocated as means of
promoting infill development and reducing suburban sprawl, but they also reduce
the supply of new development within the affected area. Particularly in "unique"
communities where the demand for developed property is relatively inelastic, local
citizens may support a smart growth policy at least partly for its capacity to
buttress real estate values.
Growth boundaries and other direct development restrictions can be
vulnerable to regulatory taking claims and political opposition, so community
governments seeking to constrain growth often "fall back on more indirect
controls" that are less susceptible to challenge.

By increasing the cost of

Fischel has cited numerous empirical studies to argue that growth controls (which
restrict the supply of new housing) tend to raise the market values of existing housing
within the relevant jurisdiction. See FISCHEL,supra note 25, at 221-23.
3 Numerous cities throughout the nation have used growth boundaries to restrict
32

growth. For a detailed description and analysis of the growth boundary approach in
Boulder, Colorado, see Joseph N. de Raismes, III et al., Growth Management
in Boulder, Colorado: A Case Study (undated) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/files/City%20Attorney/Documents/Miscellaneous%20Do
cs%20of/o2Olnterest/x-bgmcs 1jbn.pdf.
34 A "smart growth" policy is any regulatory mechanism aimed at combating
suburban sprawl. See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH:
SUCCESSFuL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 8-9 (1999). For a
thoughtful survey of smart growth policies, see generally id. at 167-320.
3 See Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 390-91 (1977). Ellickson points out that the elasticity of
demand for developed real property in a municipality greatly influences the magnitude of
effects from shifts in the supply curve. See id at 400. More "unique" jurisdictions are
typically characterized by more inelastic demand and would thus be predicted to exhibit
greater market price effects from growth restrictions than more generic suburban
communities for which there are close substitutes. See id. ("If consumer demand for
residency in a suburb is not completely elastic, its housing owners can employ growth
controls to cartelize housing supply.").
" Id. at 390.
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developing real estate within a jurisdiction,37 these indirect controls cause inward
shifts in the supply curve for development that prop up market prices for existing
homes and buildings.38
Local ordinances that impose green building requirements on new
developments are an indirect restriction on growth. Green building practices surely
reduce the environmental impact of real estate development by incorporating
stricter energy efficiency and sustainability standards into building construction
and design.3 9 However, green building ordinances also diminish developers'
flexibility in selecting materials and construction methods and are thus likely to
raise the construction costs within a jurisdiction and thereby increase the value of
developed real estate.4 0
Not surprisingly, communities throughout the nation are increasingly
embracing green building 41 and other homevoter-favored sustainability practices.
A growing number of local governments require that new, private development
projects meet the U.S. Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design (LEED) building standards or comparable green building
requirements.42 Some cities also mandate that developers protect solar access in

3 Ellickson cited "onerous design specifications in subdivision ordinances and
building codes" as examples of indirect growth controls. Id. at 391.
38 Other scholars have characterized growth controls as a means of increasing
homeowner wealth. See, e.g., FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 228 (arguing that growth controls
are an easy method by which the net worth of homeowners can be increased).
39 Green buildings are "facilities designed, built, operated, renovated, and disposed of
using ecological principles for the purpose of promoting occupant health and resource
efficiency plus minimizing the impacts of the built environment on the natural

environment." Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry's LEED: Municipal Adoption of
Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285, 287 (2010) (quoting Charles J.
Kibert, Green Buildings: An Overview of Progress, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 491,

491-92 (2004)).
40 The magnitude of cost increases associated with green building and smart growth
varies by project but is greater than zero, and even the mere perception of higher costs or
greater cost-related project risks associated with such policies can constrain growth. See
Leigh Kellett Fletcher, Green Construction Costs and Benefits: Is National Regulation
Warranted?, 24 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 18, 20 (2009) (referencing an empirical study

estimating that "LEED-certified green buildings are a minimum of 1-2 percent more
expensive to construct than traditional buildings" and conceding that "despite the benefits,
it simply costs more money to build green"); see also Bronin, supra note 18, at 245 (noting
the existence of a "perception that green building is excessively costly" but citing two
empirical studies to argue that the cost premiums for green building are modest).
41 One commentator described cities' recent willingness to adopt green development
standards as a veritable "love affair" with LEED certification. Salkin, supranote 30, at 54.
42 Examples of new green building requirements abound. The District of Columbia
and several major U.S. cities have recently adopted green building maidates for much of
the private development occurring within those jurisdictions. See, e.g., WASH., D.C., CODE
6-1451.01 to .10 (2010); CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GREEN
BUILDING ORDINANCES IN CALIFORNIA (2010), available at http://www.ag.ca.gov/
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new subdivisions,43 conserve water," or preserve urban tree populations in
connection with new development. 4 5 Support for growth-restraining sustainability
policies has seemingly been greatest in uniquely positioned cities with high real
estate prices.46 Steep market values and a comparatively inelastic demand for real
estate should theoretically mean greater property value increases from growth
controls in these jurisdictions, which may partly explain why these cities have been
swift to implement growth-restraining sustainability policies.
Green building and smart growth are laudable means of conserving scarce
energy, water, and land 4 7 without' significantly compromising community
aesthetics.48 However, given localities' increasing voluntary adoption of green
development policies and the theoretical underpinnings for such local support,
aggressive, state or federal interventions aimed at accelerating their communitylevel adoption seem less justifiable than for the homevoter-neutral and homevoterglobalwarming/pdf/green building.pdf (listing dozens of California cities with mandatory
green building ordinances, many of which apply to new privately-owned buildings).
43 See, e.g., MADISON, Wis., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 16.23(8)(a)(2)(e) (2008)
(requiring that street and lot layout in new subdivisions be oriented to maximize solar
access).
4 For example, some municipal governments in Arizona have voluntarily adopted
one-hundred-year water adequacy requirements for new subdivisions, as authorized under
state legislation passed in 2007. See, e.g., COCHISE CNTY., ARIZ., SUBDIVISION
REGULATIONS § 408.03 (2008).
45 See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE §§ 25-8-601 to -648 (establishing various
requirements for the preservation of trees in developments within city limits).
46 A recent study by Cushman & Wakefield and the Northwest Energy Efficiency
Alliance gave the highest Mandates & Incentives Scores for aggressive green development
requirements in New York City, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C.metropolitan areas notorious for having some of the highest commercial real estate values
in the nation. See BETTERBRICKS, CUSHMAN & WAKEFIELD, GREEN BUILDING
OPPORTUNITY INDEX 4 (2010), available at http://betterbricks.com/images/gbipdf/
GreenBuildinglndex-NationalOverview.pdf. The two metro areas sharing the lowest
Mandates & Incentives Scores were Detroit and Phoenix, where commercial real estate
values are far more modest. See id. (giving a score of "100" to all three New York metro
areas, an "87.5" score to Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., and a "25"
score to Phoenix and Detroit). Admittedly, the greater average wealth of the citizenry in the
former four cities may have also influenced their affection for green policies. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Private Property and the Politics of Environmental Protection,28 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 69, 73 (2004) (arguing that as "people get richer, they develop a stronger
taste for environmental amenities" and become "more willing to have a portion of their
wealth taxed to support ... public environmental protection").
4 See Bronin, supra note 18, at 244 (stating that "commercial buildings alone use
nearly twenty percent of our nation's drinking water supply" while "LEED certified
projects consume substantially less water and energy").
48 See Salkin, supra note 30, at 53 (stating that the U.S. Green Building Council's
LEED program "promotes the use of sustainable locations for building and the use of
recycled material and energy and water efficient appliances and fixtures .

promoting aesthetic quality").
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feared policies described below. Model green building ordinances, education
programs aimed at local officials, and other more passive interventions are
49
arguably more appropriate for promoting homevoter-favored policies.
C. Homevoter-NeutralSustainability
A second category of sustainable development laws is not likely to
substantially increase local property values but does not threaten home values
either. Examples of these homevoter-neutral policies might include community
garden programs,5 0 urban reforestation ordinances, ' pedestrian- or bicycle-friendly
road construction for new developments,52 green building requirements for public
54
projects,53 and mass transit-oriented planning strategies. Policies fitting within

49 It should be noted that the California Building Standards Commission recently
voted to impose a state-mandated green building code on municipalities-the only state
that has taken such an approach. See Daniel B. Wood, CaliforniaAdopts First Statewide
Building Code, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/2010/0115/California-adopts-first-statewide-green-building-code.
so Empirical evidence suggests that community gardens can potentially increase
property values, although substantial price effects tend to be limited to cases involving
well-maintained gardens in blighted areas. See loan Voicu & Vicki Been, The Effect of
Community Gardens on Neighboring Property Values, 36 REAL EST. EcON. 241, 243
(2008) (finding that "the opening of a community garden has a statistically significant
positive impact on the sales prices of properties within 1,000 feet of the garden" and that
"gardens have the greatest impact in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods"). For an
example of a community garden program, see CLEVELAND, OHIO, ZONING CODE § 336.01
(2007) (establishing an "Urban Garden District" as part of the city's zoning code "to ensure
that urban garden areas are appropriately located and protected to meet needs for local food
production, community health, community education, garden-related job training,
environmental enhancement, preservation of green space, and community enjoyment on
sites for which urban gardens represent the highest and best use for the community").
5' The Urban Reforestation and Habitat Restoration Grant Fund established in King
County, Washington, is an example of an urban reforestation program that might fit within
this category. Wild Places in City Spaces, KING COUNTY, http://www.kingcounty.gov/
environment/grants-and-awards/grant-exchange/wildplaces.aspx (last updated May 1,
2009). Under the program, private and public entities can obtain grants of up to $10,000 to
fund reforestation and habitat restoration in urban areas. Id.
52 Multiple states have developed resources to aid municipalities and private
developers with pedestrian- and bicycle-friendly development measures. See, e.g., FLA.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., WALKABLE COMMUNITIES: TWELVE STEPS FOR AN EFFECTIVE
PROGRAM (1995), available at http://www.walkable.org/assets/downloads/12STEPS.pdf;
GA. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PEDESTRIAN & STREETSCAPE GUIDE (2003), available at

http://www.walkable.org/assets/downloads/Georgiaped streetscapeguide.pdf.
5 A long list of major U.S. cities have ordinances setting green building criteria for
public projects. For a relatively recent compilation of local initiatives for green
development, including information regarding LEED mandates for municipal buildings,
see Les Lo Baugh, LEED@ Green Building Initiatives, 556 PLI/REAL 23, 47-71 (2008).
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this category often involve discrete public expenditures, at least some of which
may be offset by consequent improvements in the local tax base or by reductions in
municipal energy consumption.
In regions where social norms strongly favor "going green,"55 homevoterneutral sustainability policies may have particular appeal as a means of cultivating
a community's trendy, progressive image. Some city governments appear to
adopt such policies at least partly as a means of distinguishing their locale from
others in hopes of attracting employers or desirable economic development.
A prototypical homevoter would not strongly protest homevoter-neutral
sustainable land use practices because any negative impacts that the measures
might have on property values are usually minimal. Still, arguments that strong
state or federal programs are needed to motivate communities to adopt homevoterneutral sustainable land use policies are less convincing than for the homevoterfeared policies described below. Model ordinance provisions and intercommunity
idea-sharing programs could simplify the adoption and implementation of these

.54 Massachusetts has developed model transit-oriented development ordinance
provisions for voluntary adoption by local governments to promote greater development
density and development near transit services. See MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY &
ENVTL. AFFAIRS, TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT MODEL BYLAW (undated), available
at http://www.mass.gov/envir/smart-growthtoolkit/bylaws/TOD-Bylaw.pdf.
5 The U.S. Conference of Mayors' recent success in using peer pressure to motivate
cities to adopt sustainability policies is evidence of prevailing social norms supportive of
sustainability in much of the country. More than one thousand mayors throughout the
nation have signed the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement, committing to "strive"
to engage in various sustainability-related activities. See List ofParticipatingMayors, U.S.
CONF. OF MAYORS: MAYORS CLIMATE PROTECTION CENTER, http://www.usmayors.org/
climateprotection/list.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2010) (listing 1,044 mayors who have
signed the U.S. Mayors Climate Protection Agreement). Many of the action items in the
Climate Protection Agreement are classifiable as community-neutral, such as commitments
to promote greener transportation options or "maintain healthy urban forests." MAYORS
CLIMATE PROTECTION CTR., U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE U.S. MAYORS CLIMATE
PROTECTION AGREEMENT (2005), available at http://www.usmayors.org/climateprotection/

documents/mcpAgreement.pdf.
56 Other scholars have cited the desire to bolster a community's public image as a
motive for adopting sustainable policies. See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, Using Mandates and
Incentives to Promote Sustainable Constructionand Green Building Projects in the Private
Sector: A Callfor More State Land Use Policy Initiatives, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 731, 781

(2008) ("Indeed, some of the most vigorous green building initiatives evidence a belief that
in the near future a public commitment to sustainability will enhance, not diminish, a
locale's economic development image.").
5 Recent policy developments in Greensburg, Kansas exemplify the strategy of
embracing sustainability to set the community apart and attract investment. For a
description of sustainability efforts in Greensburg, see Keith Schneider, After a Tornado, a
Kansas Town Rebuilds Green, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009, at B6.
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policies, making them better suited than state or federal programs to promote such
policies at the local level.s
D. Green LULUs: Homevoter-FearedSustainability

A third set of sustainable land use policies are particularly susceptible to
resistance to local resistance. Rather than enhancing a community's property
values or public image, these policies require neighborhoods to accommodate land
uses that they have historically opposed.
Many landowners view distributed renewable energy devices as locally
undesirable land uses (LULUs). 59 State and federal programs aggressively promote
distributed renewables, yet local land use restrictions across the nation have long
inhibited their installation.o Such opposition undermines federal and state efforts
to promote sustainability, arguably imposing costs on the nation and the world.6 '
Despite the numerous advantages of distributed renewables, these "green"
LULUs commonly attract neighborhood opposition because of a perception that
they could impose local costs in excess of the local benefits they would provide.62
Communities have restricted the installation of distributed renewables on countless

5 See infra text accompanying notes 59-65, 109-111; see also, e.g., Solar America
Communities - About, U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://www.solaramericacommunities.

energy.gov/about (last updated Dec. 30, 2010) (describing the United States Department of
Energy's Solar America Cities Program, an innovative idea-sharing program).
* Clotheslines and xeriscaping are also arguably classifiable as green LULUs. The
analysis in this Article focuses primarily on small-scale renewable energy systems, but
much of the analysis could extend to these other sustainable land uses as well.
60 For a discussion of common land use and permitting restrictions on wind turbines
and solar panels, see DAMIAN PIr, TAKING THE RED TAPE OUT OF GREEN POWER: How TO
OVERCOME PERMITTING OBSTACLES TO SMALL-SCALE DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLE ENERGY

15-44 (2008), available at http://www.newenergychoices.org/uploads/redTape-rep.pdf.
61 For example, the U.S. Department of Energy estimates that if 20% of U.S.
electricity demand were met by wind by 2030, annual electric sector carbon dioxide
emissions would be reduced by 825 million metric tons, and the wind energy industry
alone would employ over five hundred thousand Americans. See Elizabeth Burleson, Wind
Power,National Security, and Sound Energy Policy, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 140
(2009) (citing U. S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
13 (2008)). Distributed renewable energy helps to stabilize domestic energy costs, reduce
dependence on fossil fuels, curb energy sprawl, and conserve scarce water resources. See

Ronald H. Rosenberg, Making Renewable Energy a Reality: Finding Ways to Site
Windpower Facilities,32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 635, 659-65 (2008); see

also infra text accompanying notes 68-69, 86-88.
62 This challenging combination of costs and benefits is a defining characteristic of
LULUs. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 731-32 (3d ed. 2005) (stating that communities are "reluctant" to host LULUs
because LULUs "impose (or are perceived to impose) concentrated local costs, even when
the more diffuse regional benefits outweigh those costs").
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occasions based on fears that the devices could diminish neighborhood aesthetics,
disturb nearby landowners, or threaten property values.
An ordinance that invites distributed renewables into a municipality can
arguably create greater uncertainty for local voters than an ordinance authorizing
the siting of a single waste disposal site or power plant. Unlike large-scale,
concentrated LULUs, distributed renewables are typically installed at
unpredictable locations throughout host communities over time. Individual voters
considering whether their town should host a large LULU often already know
where it would be sited and thus may have greater certainty about how it could
impact them. In contrast, distributed renewables-friendly ordinances create the risk
that any resident could ultimately see a small wind turbine or unsightly solar panel
array installed next door.64 Such broadly distributed risk can make it particularly
difficult to build local support for land use controls favoring these devices." The
following subsections discuss small wind turbines and solar panels-two common
examples of green LULUs.

Although popular perceptions of solar panels and wind turbines are difficult to
accurately measure and vary across jurisdictions, anecdotal evidence of opposition to these
systems abounds. For example, one person opposing a neighbor's solar panel installation
stated, "It's a visual nuisance ... I have to stare at these hideous panels. It might as well be
63

an ugly billboard." Freda R. Savana, Solar Panel Fight Between Neighbors Not Over Yet,
BUCKS CNTY. COURIER TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4339695. Similarly,

a United Kingdom citizen opposed softened land use requirements for wind turbines,
saying, "[T]hese plans are outrageous. It would lead to wind turbines popping up
everywhere and ruining people's lives." Major Concerns Over Wind Turbine Plan, W.

SussEx GAZETTE (Feb. 24, 2010, 12:04 PM), http://www.westsussextoday.co.uk/
In Ruhl's
news/audio-and-visual/majorconcerns_overwindturbineplan_1_838907.
words, "energy is a key player in working the sustainable development cube-we cannot
live without it, but we seem to be having difficulty living with it." J.B. Ruhl, Law for
Sustainable Development: Work Continues on the Rubik's Cube, 44
(2008).

TULSA

L. REV. 1, 4

6 In some cities and towns, allowing small wind turbines and solar panels to be
dispersed throughout a community might present a greater threat to property values than
allowing a single, larger LULU. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GROWTH CONTROLS

A REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE REGULATION 17-18 (1990) (citing empirical studies by
Ronald Lafferty and Ted Frech as evidence that the "more dispersed a community's

MATrER?:

nonresidential land uses, the lower the value, on average, of single-family homes").
65

As Fischel has noted, homeowners are "likely to be especially risk-averse" with

respect to land uses that could affect the value of their homes, and the "inability of
homeowners to obtain insurance to cover value-reducing neighborhood effects contributes
to the NIMBY [not-in-my-backyard] syndrome" exhibited by many homeowners. William
A. Fischel, Voting, Risk Aversion, and the NIMBY Syndrome: A Comment on Robert
Nelson's "Privatizingthe Neighborhood," 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 881, 885 (1999).
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1. Small Wind Turbines

Small wind turbines are an increasingly popular renewable energy source in
the United States. 66 In contrast to their commercial-scale counterparts, small wind
energy systems convert the kinetic energy in wind into electrical power that is
typically consumed on-site. 7
Distributed wind energy development has distinctive characteristics that make
it an attractive source of alternative energy. Unlike industrial-scale wind energy
projects, small wind turbine installations do not require the construction of costly
access roads and transmission lines across vast stretches of rural land and thus pose
less of a threat to wildlife and conservation areas.68 Small wind turbines also
diversify a region's renewable energy portfolio in ways that can ease pressure on
utility grids because they often generate the most power during periods when solar
panels are the least productive.
Government incentive programs and improved turbine technologies have
catalyzed dramatic growth in small wind turbine installations in recent years.70
Congress' recent extension of a 30% federal tax credit for small turbines through
the end of 201671 suggests that community officials will see a growing number of
requests for their installation for several years to come.7 2

66

See AWEA, 2009 SMALL WIND MARKET STUDY, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that half

of the one hundred megawatts of domestic generating capacity from small wind turbines
have been installed "within the past three years of the industry's 80-year history").
67 Unused power that is generated by a small wind turbine may also be transmitted
back onto the local power grid and sold to the local utility where net metering is available.
At least thirty-five states now have net metering programs. See Rules, Regulations &
Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES FOR

RENEWABLES &

http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfn (last visited Oct. 23, 2010)
(providing a list of states with net metering programs and links to relevant statutory
provisions).
68 For an insightful analysis of the problem of "energy sprawl" and how small wind
turbines and solar panels can help to address the problem, see Bronin, supra note 10, at 1523.
69 See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS'N, POLICIES TO PROMOTE SMALL WIND TURBINES 2
available at http://www.provenenergy.co.uk/index.php/download file/
(undated),
view/230/ (stating that wind turbines and photovoltaic solar panels are "natural
complements" because "wind resources are strongest in the winter and spring while solar
resources are strongest in the summer").
70 The total U.S. generating capacity from small wind turbines doubled from January
2007 to December 2009. See AWEA, 2009 SMALL WIND MARKET STUDY, supra note 3, at
3 ("[T]he U.S. market for small wind turbines . .. grew 15% in 2009 with 20.3 Megawatts
(MW) of new capacity and $82.4 million in sales. This growth equates to nearly 10,000
new units and pushes the total installed capacity in the U.S. to 10 MW.").
71 Under the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act, the 30% federal tax credit for
small wind systems was extended to all systems placed in service before 2017. See Pub. L.
EFFICIENCY,
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Unfortunately, despite aggressive government incentives for small wind
turbines, local land use restrictions often discourage installation of the devices.
Local height restrictions are perhaps the most common obstacle to small wind
turbine installations. 74 Height restrictions place limits on the permitted height of
any building or structure erected within a zone or jurisdiction. Municipalities and
homeowner associations have imposed height restrictions for decades to promote

No. 111-5, §1603, 123 Stat. 115, 364-66 (2009) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 25D); id.
§ 1603(e), 123 Stat. at 365.
72 Dozens of states have also implemented renewable energy incentive
programs,
many of which apply to small wind installations. For a table summarizing state-level
financial renewable energy incentives and links to descriptions of state-specific incentive
programs, see FinancialIncentivesfor Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF ST. INCENTIVES
FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre.cfm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2010).
The wind energy industry has made bold predictions about future growth patterns for
small wind energy development. See, e.g., AM. WIND ENERGY AsS'N, SMALL WIND
TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY: YEAR ENDING 2008, at 7 n.6 (2009) [hereinafter
AWEA, 2008 SMALL WIND MARKET STUDY] (explaining that the industry projects thirtyfold growth within as few as five years, despite a global recession). Other commentators
are similarly predicting continued growth in small wind energy development. See, e.g.,
Dwight H. Merriam, RegulatingBackyard Wind Turbines, 10 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 291, 312-13
(2009) ("[W]ith the increased concerns about sustainability, the uncertain cost of fossil
fuels, and the availability of federal and state incentives for the installation of renewable
energy systems, we are certain to see more small wind turbines in backyards.").
nA 2008 report by the American Wind Energy Association estimated that "local
permitting practices . . . thwart an estimated 1/3 of all potential small wind turbine

installations." See AWEA, 2008 SMALL WIND MARKET STUDY, supra note 72, at 10.
Other commentators have bemoaned the disparities between state and local regulatory
approaches to small-scale wind energy. See, e.g., Ernest Smith, Wind Energy: Siting
Controversies and Rights in Wind, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 281, 298 (2007)
("Overly restrictive [local] ordinances clearly run counter to state net-metering regulations,
tax incentives, and loan programs that promote the installation of small renewable energy
systems."); Jennifer R. Andriano, Commentary, The Power of Wind: CurrentLegal Issues
in Siting for Wind Power, 61 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3, 10 n.30 (2009) (noting the
"inconsistency in public policy" as it relates to wind power, "with citizens demanding
action to mitigate global warming while at the same time petitioning against wind turbines
cluttering their horizon" (quoting Brit T. Brown & Benjamin A. Escobar, Wind Power:
GeneratingElectricityand Lawsuits, 28 ENERGY L.J. 489, 492 (2007))).
74 See Jim Green & Mick Sagrillo, Zoning for Distributed Wind Powers - Breaking
Down Barriers 1, (Nat'l Renewable Energy Lab., Conference Paper No. NREL/CP-50038167, 2005), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy05osti/38167.pdf ("Prospective
distributed wind buyers frequently encounter the dilemma that existing zoning ordinances
do not address wind turbines, nor do they typically allow structures taller than 35 ft.").
7 See BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS 89 (2002) (describing the practice of imposing height restrictions within zoning
use districts that limit structure heights "to a maximum number of feet").
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fire safety, and to preserve light, air, and a rural ambiance.n Small wind turbines
often must rise well above surrounding buildings and trees to be effective,
necessitating heights that exceed local height restrictions,7 8 and can potentially
damage a community's aesthetic appeal. 79 Turbines have also been accused of
creating safety hazards,80 noise,8 1 or flicker effects 82 that can annoy neighbors and
depress surrounding property values.

Early height restrictions in the United States were at least partly motivated by fire
safety concerns. See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, THE U.S. SMALL WIND TURBINE INDUSTRY
ROADMAP 22 (2002) [hereinafter AWEA, SMALL WIND TURBINE] ("Most local
jurisdictions limit the height of structures in residential and sometimes other zones to 35
feet. This restriction was developed nearly 100 years ago to ensure that the height of
structures would not exceed the capability of firefighting equipment to pump water. Today,
this height limit is a significant obstacle to siting small wind turbines.").
7 See PETER W. SALSICH & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION 174
(2003) ("Height restrictions are imposed for several reasons, including regulation of overall
development density through limitations on building size, provision of open space, light,
and air, preservation of rural character, and safety, such as from aircraft landing and taking
off from airports.").
78 See AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: How AND WHY TO
PERMIT FOR SMALL WIND SYSTEMS, A GUIDE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 6
(2008) [hereinafter AWEA, GOVERNMENT PERMIT GUIDE] (stating that the "bottom of the
turbine rotor should clear the highest wind obstacle (rooftop, mature tree, etc.) within a 500
foot radius by at least 30 feet" and suggesting that typical small wind turbines are mounted
atop towers that are 35 to 120 feet tall); David Mears, Feasibility of Residential Wind
Energy: The Lack of Regulatory Integrationfor Local Communities, 37 REAL EST. L.J.
133, 137 (2008) ("Winds are faster at higher elevations, causing wind power to increase by
a factor of three as the speed increases. This means that even a small boost in height greatly
enhances a turbine's output.").
7 See PITT, supra note 60, at 29; see also AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N, PERMITTING
SMALL WIND TURBINES: A HANDBOOK 13 (2003) [hereinafter AWEA, PERMITTING
HANDBOOK] (arguing that the visibility of small wind turbines on neighboring properties is
"unavoidable" and that the right of landowners to install small wind devices on their
76

properties "must be weighed against those who object to turbines on aesthetic grounds").
80 The most commonly-voiced safety-concerns over wind turbines relate to the
possibility of a turbine falling over or of ice sheets flying from its rotor blades. See, e.g.,
Stephen Harland Butler, Headwinds to a Clean Energy Future: Nuisance Suits Against
Wind Energy Projects in the United States, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (2009)
(analyzing the dismissal of a nuisance claim against a wind power development based in
part on a "large piece of ice" the plaintiff suspected had been "thrown" from the turbine
(citing Rassier v. Houim, 488 N.W.2d 635, 638 (N.D. 1992))). Renewable energy
proponents assert that proper small turbine siting and installation can adequately mitigate
these safety concerns. See, e.g., AWEA, GOVERNMENT PERMIT GUIDE, supra note 78, at
18-21 (refuting claims that properly installed small wind turbines create an attractive
nuisance, throw sheets of ice, attract lightning, or create stray voltage); AWEA
PERMITTING HANDBOOK, supra note 79, at 15 ("No public injuries have been attributed to
falls from the thousands of unfenced small turbine towers installed over the past 25
years.").
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For these and other reasons, land use regulations in many communities
directly or indirectly restrict or prohibit small wind turbine installations within
their jurisdiction. Even when local zoning and subdivision covenants are silent as
to small turbines, landowners' uncertainty over whether local authorities will
challenge the turbines can still deter their installation.8
2. Solar Energy Systems

Photovoltaic solar panels and other solar energy systems are also an important
means of generating renewable energy. Rooftop and ground-mounted solar panels
81 See

Mears, supra note 78, at 144-45 (arguing that "small wind turbines tend to be
noisier for their size than large turbine machines" but that "well-designed wind turbines are
generally quiet in operation, and compared to the noise of road traffic, trains, aircraft, and
construction activities . .. the noise from wind turbines is very low").
82 Merriam, supra note 72, at 302-03 ("When the blades are turning, there is a flicker
to the shadow [of a wind turbine] which can be quite disturbing. It does not happen often,
or for long periods, but for nearby properties it can be an annoyance."). Some have argued
that small turbines are less likely to create nuisance-causing flicker effects than large
turbines and that these effects can often be avoided through proper turbine siting. See
AWEA, GOVERNMENT PERMIT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 17 (explaining that "[s]mall
turbines . . . spin much faster than utility-scale turbines so that any shadows become
essentially invisible at operating speeds. . . . [and] normal setback distances . . . mitigate[],

if not entirely eliminate[]" the risk of a nuisance from flicker effects, "especially at U.S.
latitudes").
83 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 73, at 298 (citing SARATOGA, CAL., CODE § 15-52.010
to .090 (2002)) (restricting locations within the jurisdiction where small wind turbines may
be installed); see also Andriano, supra note 73, at 7 (noting that one town prohibits the
"installation, erection, or use of a wind energy system, wind turbines, and/or associated
towers for wind energy conversion" in all of its zoning districts (citing BLOWING ROCK,
N.C., TowN CODE § 16-149(C)(3) (2007)); Mike Rose, Residential Wind Turbines Off the
Table, AUSTIN DAILY HERALD (May 18, 2010, 8:00 AM), available at
http://www.austindailyheiald.com/2010/05/18/residential-wind-turbines-off-the-table/
(describing new city code amendments in Austin, Texas, that generally prohibit the
installation of small wind turbines in residential areas).
84 Other scholars have noted this uncertainty problem created by the absence of
references to renewable energy development in many local ordinances. See, e.g., Bronin,
supra note 18, at 253 ("Where relevant language [regarding wind turbines and other
renewable energy devices] does not appear in the ordinances, applicants cannot know in
advance whether the installation or modification of green technologies is subject to zoning
board review. Applicants may review the ordinance, and, seeing no relevant language,
proceed with construction, only to be told later that they must dismantle the structure or
pay a fine."); see also Green & Sagrillo, supra note 74, at 1 (describing a California
legislative committee's finding that potential buyers of small wind turbines "were
'thwarted by archaic or even hostile local land-use regulations,' and as many as 'half the
applicants will give up in disgust' (quoting Beverly J. Shane, Solving California'sEnergy
Crisis: The Answer May be Blowing in the Wind, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 403, 413

(2001))).
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convert the radiant energy in sunlight into electric power.85 Given the myriad
benefits of solar energy development, it is not surprising that new solar panel
installations are eligible for many of the same federal tax credits and other
incentive programs that apply to small wind turbines.8 6 Solar energy systems offer
the unique benefit of being most productive on hot, sunny days when consumers
are using air conditioning systems and utility grid demands are near their peak.
The distributed nature of rooftop solar development also curbs energy sprawl,
enabling renewable energy development without the need for new transmission
lines through pristine rural areas.88
However, some landowners view solar energy systems as disruptive to
neighborhood aesthetics or as threats to surrounding property values. Aware of
popular objections to solar panels, numerous homeowner associations 89 and local
governments9o have adopted provisions that prohibit or severely restrict installation
of the devices.

85

For a discussion of solar energy technologies and recent growth in the rooftop solar

energy, see Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different
Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 851, 854-56.

The 30% federal tax credit applicable to small wind turbines also applies to solar
panel installations. 26 U.S.C. § 25D(a)(1) (2006). See generally Jason Coughlin & Karlynn
86

Cory, Solar Photovoltaic Financing: Residential Sector Deployment 1-18 (Nat'l

Renewable Energy Lab., Technical Report, NREL/TP-6A2-44853, 2009), available at
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09ostil44853.pdf (describing numerous state and local
incentives for rooftop solar energy).
87 See Bernadette Del Chiaro & Rachel Gibson, Government's Role in Creating a
Vibrant Solar Power Market in California, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 347, 355 (2006)

("[S]olar power is well-suited to reduce peak demand in California since it generates
energy at times it is needed most-during heavy air conditioning use.").
8 See Bronin, supranote 10, at 7-11. Recent debates over the commercial-scale solar
energy project proposals in the Mojave Desert are emblematic of the pressure that
renewable energy needs can place on conservation areas. For a description of the Mojave
Desert conflict, see Todd Woody, It's Green Against Green in Mojave Desert SolarBattle,
YALE ENv'T 360
89

(Feb. 1, 2010), http://e360.yale.edulcontent/feature.msp?id=2236.

See, e.g., Tracy Loew, Homeowners Fight to Go Green, USA TODAY, May 13,

2010, at A3 (noting that the homeowner association boards "have a duty to maintain
property values" and quoting a Houston-based solar panel installer's estimate that "20% of
[his] potential customers run into problems with [homeowner] associations" when seeking
to install solar energy systems); Edythe Jensen, HOA Denies Homeowner Solar Panel Use
Due to Color, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Jan. 3, 2008, 11:16 AM), available at

http://www.azcentral.com/12news/news/articles/0103cr-solarinside0102-CP.html?&wired#
(describing a homeowner association's objection to the installation of a solar panel based
on its black color-instead of gray or "terra cotta"). For additional examples of local
opposition to solar panels, see supra notes I and 59.
90 See, e.g., PIr, supra note 60, at 15-28.
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III. ACCOMMODATING DISTRIBUTED RENEWABLES: EXISTING APPROACHES

In spite of state and federal policies aimed at promoting distributed renewable
energy, local land use regulations continue to deter many landowners from
installing small wind turbines and solar panels.9' A handful of communities have
voluntarily adopted provisions that accommodate these green LULUs,92 but most
have proven reluctant to do so. Existing state and federal attempts to address
communities' reluctance have been either overaggressive or not strong enough to
overcome local resistance. The following is a discussion of the merits and
deficiencies of several current approaches to combating local resistance to
distributed renewable energy, none of which satisfactorily addresses the problem.
A. Deference to Community Governments

Most state governments have done relatively little to address local barriers to
distributed renewables. Their "hands-off' approach may preserve the autonomy of
local governments, but it also fails to motivate communities to accommodate
distributed renewables in their land use policies.
Persuading communities to revise their land use controls to allow for
distributed renewables is politically challenging because it requires local
landowners to relinquish valuable rights relating to their properties. Zoning
ordinances and subdivision covenants give landowners exclusion rights in common
airspace, rooftops, and other areas within a local jurisdiction, protecting against
countless risks by restricting activities on nearby parcels.93 Landowners are prone
to resist forfeiting these exclusion rights without receiving something in return.
A stylized example illustrates this problem. Suppose the developer of the
fictional, fifty-lot residential subdivision of Green Acres had recorded a height
restriction covenant against the subdivision property years ago. The covenant
prohibited lot owners from erecting any structure that extended more than thirty9 1 See supra text accompanying notes 60, 73-74, 83, 89.
92 See, e.g., AWEA, SMALL WIND TURBINE, supra note

76, at 23-28 (describing
zoning ordinances in certain California counties that allow small wind turbines with
varying degrees of restrictiveness); Beau Yarbrough, City Council Approves New Rules for
Windmills, Solar Panels, HESPERIA STAR (Feb. 3, 2010, 5:07 PM), available at
(describing a new
http://www.hesperiastar.com/articles/city-3169-windmill-solar.html
Hesperia, California, ordinance allowing the installation of small wind turbines and solar
panels on private properties in compliance with certain height, setback, and other
restrictions); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and the Greening of Comprehensive Plans
and Land Use Regulations 12 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (citing NORTHAMPTON,
MASS., CITY CODE § 195-5(A)(14) (2008)), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-l 162499
(noting that Northampton, Massachusetts, exempts rooftop solar panel installation from
Historic District Commission review).
9 Fennell has utilized this paradigm of land use controls in the context of private
community covenants. See LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME 76-80 (2009).
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five feet above a lot's surface. By virtue of the covenant, the lot owners in the
subdivision had each relinquished their common law property rights to occupy all
usable airspace situated more than thirty-five feet above their respective lots. 94 In
return, each owner received rights to prevent the other forty-nine lot owners from
occupying corresponding airspace above their properties.9 5
This sort of reciprocal arrangement, which has been repeated in thousands of
subdivision covenants throughout the country, theoretically benefits all lot owners
in Green Acres. Each owner voluntarily agreed to be subject to the covenant by
purchasing a lot within the subdivision, so presumably most of the landowners
prefer the covenant arrangement. The covenant spares landowners from having to
negotiate and obtain covenants from each of their forty-nine different neighbors to
protect their enjoyment of the neighborhood's views and aesthetic qualities.96
Unfortunately, restrictions in subdivision covenants can also result in the
underuse of community resources. One could argue that the height restriction
covenant encumbering Green Acres creates a sort of "anticommons"-a regime in
which each lot owner "owns a right to exclude, and consequently for which no one
owns a privilege of entry and use."97 If any lot owner in Green Acres sought to
construct improvements rising above thirty-five feet, any other owner would have
standing to enforce the subdivision covenant and preclude the construction.
94 Under prevailing United States common law, fee owners of real property ordinarily
hold rights in the airspace above the surface of their parcels under the ad coelum doctrine.
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (holding that a "landowner owns at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the
land. The fact that he does not occupy it in a physical sense-by the erection of buildings
and the like-is not material" (citation omitted)).
9
Legal scholars have long characterized private subdivision covenants as a
reciprocal exchange of interests among lot owners. See, e.g., FENNELL, supra note 93, at 77
n.37 ("By purchasing a home in a residential private government community, the owner
waives part of the incidents of his title; he is compensated for this diminution of rights,
however, by the generally improved living conditions ... provided for all members of the
community." (quoting Uriel Reichman, Judicial Supervision of Servitudes, 7 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 139 (1978)).
96 See id. (noting that lot owners within a subdivision could theoretically attempt to
"construct a community-wide web. of reciprocal covenants from scratch" that mirrored a
single set of original subdivision covenants but that the "transaction costs" of doing so
"would be prohibitive").
9 Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322 n.22 (1993).
Heller popularized the concept of an "anticommons" with a law review article devoted to it

in 1998. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition

from Marx to Markets, Ill HARv. L. REv. 621 (1998). The airspace at issue might be more
precisely classified as a "conservation commons" because landowners still make
nontrespassory use of the airspace above their land to preserve sunlight or views. For a
general discussion of the concept of a "conservation commons," see Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1, 3-6, 39

(2003) (characterizing Central Park in Manhattan as a conservation commons and defining
a conservation commons as a "commons whose most efficient use is nonuse").
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Professor Michael Heller famously observed that such anticommons property tends
to be underutilized because of the great difficulty of obtaining requisite
permissions for its use.98 As it relates to small wind turbines, the airspace burdened
by height restrictions can potentially be vulnerable to this problem.
Suppose that the Green Acres Homeowner Association was to consider
amending its subdivision covenants to exempt small wind turbines from the
subdivision's height restriction. Suppose further that if the amendment were
approved, five lot owners within the subdivision would install small turbines and
save a combined total of $5,000 in electricity bills, after accounting for the costs of
the turbines and their installation. However, the turbines would create noise,
aesthetic impacts, and a risk of future turbine installations that imposed aggregate
losses of $4,000 on the other forty-five lot owners.
If transaction costs were sufficiently low, the five landowners hoping to
install turbines would reach Coasean bargains with the other forty-five owners by
offering to compensate each neighbor for the expected loss in exchange for their
permission to install the five turbines. 99 These five landowners would collectively
offer between $4,000 and $5,000 and the neighbors would accept the offer,
generating a Pareto efficientloo outcome with a $1,000 net social benefit.10
Of course, in reality, successful Coasean bargaining in this context would be
highly improbable given the large number of parties involved.10 2 Even if the five
See Heller, supra note 97, at 624 ("In an anticommons ... multiple owners are each
endowed with a right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective
privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource
is prone to underuse-a tragedy of the anticommons.").
99 Coasean bargaining is voluntary bargaining of the nature described in the famous
98

Coase Theorem. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 2-8

(arguing that if transaction costs between parties are sufficiently low and an entitlement has
been assigned to one of them, the parties will negotiate the transfer of the entitlement to its
highest-valued user).
100 A change is Pareto efficient if it makes at least one person better off without
making any person worse off. See HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 40 (5th ed. 1999).
Pareto efficiency is often contrasted with Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which requires merely
that the aggregate social benefits of a change exceed the aggregate social costs. See
Ellickson & Been, supra note 62, at 96.
101 The $1,000 figure is merely the difference between the $5,000 net benefit accruing
to the turbine owners and the $4,000 in aggregate losses to their neighbors. For the sake of
simplicity, this example purposely ignores positive externalities of wind energy generation.
For a numerical example incorporating positive externalities, see infra text accompanying
notes 117-122.
102 The notion that transaction costs for Coasean bargaining tend to be higher in
multiple-party settings seems well-accepted in law & economics literature. See, e.g., James

E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in

Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 460 (1995) ("When many people have to bargain,
their sheer numbers can prevent efficient trades because it takes longer (costs more) for a

lot of people to reach accord than it does for a few. Hence high transaction costs might
swamp the value of the transaction itself to the parties."). Among other things, the five lot
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landowners could request the height restriction amendment through a homeowner
association board that could limit collective action problems, the board would
likely reject the proposal. Only board members who planned to purchase and
install turbines on their own lot would expect to personally benefit from the
amendment and would therefore be inclined to support it, and it is unlikely that
such members would comprise a majority of the board.
The political obstacles to bargaining over restrictions on distributed
renewables are more severe in the context of a municipal ordinance than under
private covenants. Rights held collectively by residents under zoning restrictions
are not "ordinary, property-rule-protected entitlement[s] that [residents] can
alienate to any willing buyer or on mutually agreeable terms."' 0 3 As Professor Lee
Fennell has noted, zoning-based rights typically "cannot be sold outright" and can
only be "bargained over pursuant to an arcane amalgam of legal rules, entrenched
local practices, social norms, and political influence."1 04 Transfers of such rights
usually take the form of variances or special exceptions. 05 Negotiated cash or inkind payments for a landowner's "purchase" of zoning-based rights from a
municipality are essentially development exactions, which are subject to
constitutional constraints.10 6
B. Vague State Mandates
Recognizing the need to do something to prevent local land use controls from
deterring small wind and solar energy installations, some state legislatures have
enacted statutes that generically instruct localities to accommodate distributed
renewables. For instance, a Pennsylvania statute obligates municipalities to
develop strategies in their comprehensive plans to "reduce energy consumption
10 7
A
and to promote the effective utilization of renewable energy resources."
similar law in Connecticut directs local planning commissions to consider "the
objectives of energy-efficient patterns of development [and] the use of solar and
owners hoping to install turbines might attempt to free ride by understating their
willingness to pay to buy back the covenant rights and the other forty-five lot owners
would have incentives to hold out by overstating the amounts of compensation they would
require to relinquish their covenant rights. See id. ("[T]here are the special problems that
arise when an exchange will necessarily benefit many people at once (giving rise to free
rider problems) or when many people have to agree to an exchange in order for it to be
consummated (giving rise to holdout problems).").
103
104

FENNELL, supra note 93, at 72.
d

'os Id. at 74 (noting that "some degree of flexibility" in assignments of land use rights
under zoning provisions "is imported through mechanisms like variances and special
exceptions").
See generally Mark Fenster, RegulatingLand Use in a ConstitutionalShadow: The
Institutional Contexts of Exactions, 58 HASTINGs L.J. 729 (2007) (discussing development
exactions and constitutional constraints on such devices in the land use context).
107 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 10301.1 (West 1997).
106
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other renewable forms of energy and energy conservation" in the planning
process. 0 8
Although these sorts of general statutory directives from state legislatures are
surely better than no state-level encouragement at all, such broad language is
insufficient to incite substantial change at the local level. Enforcing vague statutory
mandates against municipalities can be difficult and expensive because it requires
proving the violation of a provision with few or no specific requirements. As a
result, many local governments are likely to continue regulating in their own selfinterest in the absence of more specific statutory requirements.
C. Targeted Community Grants

An innovative approach to promoting community acceptance of distributed
renewables is to support a select group of municipalities' experimentation with
land use policies aimed at encouraging installation of the devices. For example, the
United States Department of Energy's Solar America Cities program provides
grants to twenty-five metropolitan areas to promote development of solar energy
programs and policies.109 The metropolitan areas selected for the program are also
eligible for professional and technical assistance to help them formulate new ways
of encouraging solar power at the local level.1" 0
Formed in 2007, the Solar America Cities program also funds activities aimed
at sharing successful local policy strategies with other cities outside of the core
group of twenty-five."' By focusing its funding on a few pioneer cities, the
program could make substantial progress in developing workable policies to
promote solar energy in urban and suburban settings. Of course, without special
funding, outside cities may have comparatively less of an incentive to
accommodate distributed renewables within their boundaries. Thus, while such
inventive approaches are highly valuable, additional strategies are necessary to
eliminate community barriers to distributed renewables on a broader scale.
D. One-Sided Incentive Programs

Increasingly in recent years, governments have used subsidies,11 2 net metering
programs,11 3 and other financial initiatives to make distributed renewables a more
attractive investment for landowners. While these programs are laudable, they
'os

Salkin, supra note 13, at 10 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-23(d)(9) (2009)).

109

See Solar America Communities - About, supra note 58.

For a list of the twenty-five cities participating in the Solar America Cities
program, see id.
"o

" Solar America Communities - Outreach Partnership,U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY,

http://www.solaramericacities.energy.gov/about/technicaloutreach/ (last visited June 16,
2010) (describing Solar America Cities' outreach efforts).
112 For a description of federal subsidies available to installers of distributed
renewables, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 67 for a brief description of net metering.
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arguably address only one of the two externality problems afflicting green energy
development.
Distributed renewables create positive externalities--diffused national and
global benefits that often are not fully internalized by owners of the devices."14
Most subsidies and other government incentives seek to address this positive
externality problem by reducing landowners' costs of purchasing and installing the
devices to encourage more installations.
Unfortunately, governments devote far less attention to addressing the
negative externality associated with distributed renewables: the costs they can
impose on neighbors. As described above, distributed renewables are sometimes
perceived to cause aesthetic degradation, noise, flickers, glares, or diminutions in
neighboring property values that landowners may not fully consider when deciding
whether to install the devices." 5 Neglecting these negative externalities can lead to
inefficient, lopsided policies.
A numerical example can illustrate the shortcomings of the one-sided
incentive approach. Returning to the Green Acres fact pattern from above,"'6
suppose that the five lot owners who planned to install small wind turbines upon
approval of the height restriction amendment would save only $3,000 in energy
bills, rather than the previous $5,000 amount. The turbines would still impose
$4,000 in aggregate costs on others within the subdivision but would also generate
diffuse, net external benefits for individuals residing outside the community
totaling $1,500. Under these assumptions, adopting the turbine-friendly covenant
amendment would still be a Kaldor-Hicks efficient move, generating a net social
benefit of $500.1' However, the community's fifty landowners would be unable to
capture the $1,500 of global and national benefits resulting from the turbine
installations so, within the community, the amendment would generate a $1,000 net
loss. Even if the transaction costs of Coasean bargaining among the fifty lot
owners were zero, the height restriction amendment would not pass.
In an effort to correct the market failure created by this positive externality
problem, Congress could offer a $300 Pigouvian subsidy to each of the five lot
owners who installed small wind turbines."' The aggregate net benefit to those
For further discussion of the national and global benefits from increased reliance
on wind and solar power, see supra text accompanying note 61. See also Pursley &
Wiseman, supra note 11 (providing a detailed description of the national benefits of
distributed renewable energy).
114

115
116

See supra text accompanying notes 80-82 and 89-90.
See supra Part III.A.

...$500 is simply the difference between the aggregate (community-wide and
external) benefits that would result from the amendment and the costs it would impose on
the community. ($3,000 + $1,500) - $4,000 = $500. For a definition of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency and comparison to Pareto efficiency, see supra note 100.
118 Federal subsidies are presently available to installers of small renewable energy
devices. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. A.C. Pigou helped to popularize the
concept of externalities and the use of taxation to correct market failures associated with
negative externalities. See A.C. PIGOu, THE EcoNoMics OF WELFARE 329-35 (4th ed.
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owners would increase to $4,500,119 exceeding the aggregate $4,000 loss imposed
on their neighbors. If transaction costs among Green Acres lot owners were
sufficiently low, Coasean bargaining would occur: the five would-be turbine
installers would successfully negotiate for a subdivision covenant amendment with
their forty-five neighbors and would install the turbines. 120
Unfortunately, collective action problems would likely still impede bargaining
among the fifty landowners in Green Acres and the amendment proposal would
likely fail.12 ' By offering the full amount of the Pigouvian subsidy solely to the
five turbine-installing landowners to address the positive externalities associated
with renewable energy, Congress failed to address the negative externalities the
turbines would impose on neighbors.1 22 State and federal programs aimed solely at
rewarding landowners who install distributed renewables on their properties will
be of limited effectiveness until policymakers confront the community-level
negative externalities arising from such installations.
E. Preemption ofLocal Regulations

The most aggressive means for states or the federal government to counter
community resistance to distributed renewables is to invalidate local restrictions
1932). Based on an analogous theory, Pigouvian subsidies can correct a market failure
generated by a positive externality. The use of subsidies to promote the internalization of
positive externalities is a basic microeconomics principle and has appeared in other
sustainability policy discussions. See, e.g., Carl J. Circo, Does Sustainability Require a
New Theory of PropertyRights?, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 91, 116 (2009) (stating that Pigou's

analysis may "be used to justify government subsidies and regulations calculated to
influence economic decisions in circumstances in which natural market forces are
inadequate to assure that the externalities of an economic decision properly figure into the
cost-benefit analysis" (citing STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONoMIC ANALYSIS OF
THE LAW 108 (2004)).
1'9 $300 per lot owner, multiplied by five lot owners, would equal $1,500. Adding this
sum to the $3,000 amount of energy savings yields $4,500.
120 Specifically, the five lot owners would collectively offer an amount between
$4,000 and $4,500 to the other forty-five lot owners to purchase back the covenant rights.

The forty-five lot owners would accept the offer amount since it would exceed their
expected $4,000 loss from the amendment.
121 As mentioned in Part II.A, bargaining among large numbers of parties is

commonly viewed as more difficult and expensive and thus more likely to fail.
122 Had the height restriction been imposed under a zoning ordinance rather than
a
private covenant, the analysis would have been largely the same. Fischel and Nelson have
long characterized zoning in this fashion. FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 54 ("Robert Nelson
and I have said for a long time and in many places that zoning is best thought of as
collective property rights whose benefit inures to the politically dominant group of the
municipality that does the zoning." (citations omitted)). Landowners who choose to live
within the jurisdiction implicitly agree to subject their own properties to all applicable land
use restrictions, recognizing that they will receive the benefit of being surrounded by other

properties that must also comply with applicable ordinances. Id. at 58.
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that stand in their way. Because most municipalities derive their
from the state, 12 3 state governments often have the power
regulations in order to advance statewide objectives. State
similarly invalidate private subdivision covenant provisions

1249
land use authority
to preempt local
governments can
on public policy

grounds.124
Some researchers advocate the preemption of local land use regulations as the
best strategy for overcoming neighborhood resistance to distributed renewables. 12 5
State or federal government authorities have already used preemption to combat
local opposition to the siting of cell towers,126 group homes, 12 waste disposal
sites, 12 8 and myriad other LULUs. States have even defeated local resistance to
large-scalewind energy projects based on their preemption power. 129
A growing number of states have enacted laws invalidating local land use
ordinances that hinder renewable energy. A Florida law prohibits local governing
bodies in that state from adopting any ordinance that "prohibits or has the effect of
prohibiting the installation of solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy devices
123
124

See BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, supra note 22, at 2-3.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court case of Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,

20-23 (1948), famously established the governmental power to invalidate racially
restrictive covenants. Of course, the limitations on freedom of contract in the private real
estate covenant context extend beyond racial restrictions. For a recent discussion of the
scope of the power of the federal government and state governments to invalidate private
covenants, see Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer Incorrectly Decided? Some New
Answers, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 451, 461-69 (2007).

For example, researchers at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory have
recommended preemption to address local opposition to small wind turbine siting. See
Green & Sagrillo, supra note 74, at 8 ("[W]e recommend limited state preemption of home
rule as being a viable and attractive approach for advocates to pursue in addressing the
distributed wind zoning barrier.").
126 The American Wind Energy Association has cited federal preemption of local laws
to facilitate cell tower siting as an example of successful use of the preemption power. See
AWEA, GOVERNMENT PERMIT GUIDE, supra note 78, at 24 ("Federal preemption of home
rule for cell phone towers enabled the industry to expand dramatically, which would not
125

have likely occurred without it. Fair zoning for small wind turbines could bring similar
economic benefits.").
127 See Vicki Been, What's FairnessGot to Do with It? EnvironmentalJustice and the
Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1001, 1068 (1993)

(describing how communities throughout the country initially "resisted group homes in
their neighborhoods by attempting to zone out such homes" but that "[e]ventually, most
states preempted local zoning regulations and prohibited discrimination against group
homes").
128 See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 179 (explaining that many states in the 1970s and

1980s enacted laws that preempted local land use regulations to defeat local opposition to
hazardous and municipal waste sites).
129 See, e.g., Residents Opposed to Kittitas Turbines v. State Energy Facility Site
Evaluation Council, 197 P.3d 1153, 1176-77 (Wash. 2008) (holding that a Washington
state law governing the siting of. wind energy projects preempted local land use
regulations).
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based on renewable resources."o30 Statutes enacted in California,13' Delaware, 13 2
Indiana,' 33 Nevada,134 New Hampshire,'3 5 Vermont,136 and Wisconsin 37 similarly
limit municipal land use restrictions on solar panels or small wind energy systems.
At first glance, preemption might seem an appealing means of removing local
roadblocks to green energy once and for all. With an estimated twenty-five
thousand local zoning jurisdictions scattered across the United States, the costs and
time that would be required to contact and persuade each locality to adopt
renewable energy-friendly policies are prohibitive.' 38 Even if it were somehow
130 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.04(1) (West 2006). For the statutory definition of
"governing body," see id § 163.3164(9).
'3' See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 17959.1 (West 2006) (requiring cities and
counties to approve permit applications for the installation of solar energy systems unless
the municipality "makes written findings based upon substantial evidence in the record that
the proposed installation would have a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or
safety, and there is no feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific,
adverse impact"); see also CAL Gov'T CODE § 65850.5 (West 2009) (setting forth similar
statutory requirements for the local permits necessary for the installation of solar energy
devices).
132 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 8060 (West 2010) (prohibiting any "county or
municipal government" from adopting any restriction more restrictive than certain
delineated statutory standards "which prohibits or restricts the owner of a property from
using a system for obtaining wind energy for a residential single family dwelling unit").
'33 See IND. CODE ANN. § 36-7-2-8(b) (LexisNexis 2009) (disallowing local
government ordinances that have the "effect of prohibiting or of unreasonably restricting
the use of solar energy systems other than for the preservation or protection of the public
health and safety").
134 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278.0208 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting governing
bodies from placing unreasonable restrictions on the installation of solar energy devices).
'3 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 674:63 (2010) (providing that "[o]rdinances or
regulations adopted by municipalities to regulate the installation and operation of small
wind energy systems shall not unreasonably limit such installations or unreasonably hinder
the performance of such installations" and describing certain restrictions that constitute
"unreasonable" limits).
136 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 544 (West 2010) (providing that "no deed
restrictions, covenants, or similar binding agreements running with the land shall prohibit
or have the effect of prohibiting the installation of solar collectors, clotheslines, or other
energy devices based on renewable resources," with exceptions made for patio railings in
condominiums, cooperatives and apartments).
'1" See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1) (West 2003) (prohibiting political subdivisions
of the state from placing "any restriction, either directly or in effect, on the installation or
use of . .. a wind energy system" that is more restrictive than the state-enacted rules or
from placing restrictions on any "solar energy system" or "wind energy system" unless the
restriction "(a) [s]erves to preserve or protect the public health or safety[;] (b) [d]oes not
significantly increase the cost of the system or significantly decrease its efficiency[; or] (c)
[a]llows for an alternative system of comparable cost and efficiency").
'3 See Green & Sagrillo, supra note 74, at 3 (stating that there are about 25,000 local
zoning jurisdictions in the United States and referencing the American Wind Energy
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feasible to separately convince each municipality to amend its ordinances, the
resulting patchwork of local regulations could create uncertainty and confusion for
turbine and solar panel installers.139 A state law preempting municipal restrictions
on distributed renewables amends all applicable ordinances in the state in one fell
swoop and creates greater regulatory consistency among local jurisdictions.
However, broadly preempting local ordinances to accommodate distributed
renewables is an imprecise, one-size-fits-all approach that ignores local issues and
concerns. 140 No two neighborhoods are identical. Each has different geographic,
topographic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics that create unique sets of
values, social norms, and problems. Recognizing the vast diversity among local
jurisdictions, scholars have long argued that municipal governments are ordinarily
better situated to make local land use decisions than their state-level
counterparts.14 1 Local officials typically reside within the jurisdictions they serve
and tend to have a more specialized understanding than state officials of a
community's unique characteristics and challenges.14 2 State statutes preempting
Association's estimate that persuading California's 534 local jurisdictions to adopt windfriendly ordinances would cost about $20 million).
139 See Bronin, supra note 18, at 255 ("[T]his type of piecemeal decision making
tends to ignore extralocal effects, exclude low-income outsiders, shift environmental
problems to neighbors, and thwart orderly and predictable development." (citing Carol M.
Rose, Planningand Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 840-42 (1983))).
140 A California law that preempted home rule to require communities to

accommodate small wind energy systems (and expired under a sunset clause in 2005) was
criticized on this ground. See Beverly J. Shane, Solving Calfornia's Energy Crisis: The
Answer May Be Blowing in the Wind, 33 McGEORGE L. REv. 403, 412-13 (2002) (citing a

letter from a frustrated local planning official to argue that the California law "mandates
one-size-fits-all siting and installation requirements that ignore local land-use goals and
policies rather than provid[ing] guidance to local governments to develop individual
standards" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
141 Numerous commentators have emphasized the importance of local government
involvement in increasing sustainable land use practices. See, e.g., Long, supra note 12, at
21 ("In the context of . . . sustainability, [localized] land-use authority allows each

community to make its own determinations about what it should look like, what types of
land uses it will prefer, and how it should develop over time."); Pursley & Wiseman, supra
note 11 (manuscript at 46) (arguing that the "variability of local conditions cautions against
uniform, one-size-fits-all programs that are characteristic of federal action" and "highlights

the important role for state or local governments, whose greater familiarity with and
expertise regarding local conditions" might be leveraged to create more effectively tailored
solutions); Patricia E. Salkin, Can You Hear Me Up There? Giving Voice to Local
Communities Imperativefor Achieving Sustainability,4 ENVTL. ENERGY & L. POL'Y J. 256,

258 (2009) ("[T]he voices and actions of local governments are critical to achieving truly
sustainable communities, especially in the climate change arena."); see also Nolon, supra
note 15, at 47 ("[L]ocal governments are among the critical actors whose cooperation must
be secured to stabilize CO 2 emissions.").
142

Other land use scholars have noted the advantages of local land use policymaking.

See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 18, at 238 (citing Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Ownership and the
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local land use authority are thus prone to inefficiencies from inadequate
consideration of localized factors in the policymaking process. State laws
invalidating subdivision covenant restrictions on distributed renewablesl 4 3
similarly overlook local concerns.
Consider the impact of a preemptive state law on the fictional city of
Beachtown, a resort community known for its exceptional views and aesthetic
appeal. Suppose that the existing ordinances in Beachtown protected the local
ambiance by prohibiting structures (including wind turbines) from rising more than
thirty-five feet above any parcel's surface, thereby protecting $200,000 in total
property value premiums within the jurisdiction. If allowing turbines within the
municipality would generate only $20,000 in aggregate social benefits but would
diminish the aggregate value of Beachtown's viewshed by $100,000, then a state
law preempting the local height restriction to allow wind turbines would generate
an $80,000 deadweight loss.14 4
Decentralized land use regulation mitigates such inefficiencies by
empowering community officials with comparatively better information about a
proposal's local costs and benefits to make policy decisions. A provision
exempting communities from preemption upon a showing of undue hardship might
inject some flexibility into a preemption statute but would likely cause additional
problems. Such a provision would create incentives for communities to overstate
Level ofRegulation: The Particularsof Owning, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 574, 580 (1999)).
143 Several

states have laws that invalidate unreasonable restrictions on wind or solar
energy devices in private subdivision covenants. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33439, -1816 (2007 & Supp. 2009) (covering only solar energy systems); CAL CIV. CODE
§ 714 (West 2007) (covering only solar energy systems); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-30-168
(2010) (covering both solar panels and small wind turbines); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.04(2)
(West 2008) (covering "solar collectors, clotheslines, or other energy device[s] based on
renewable resources"); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 196-7 (LexisNexis 2008) (covering "solar
energy devices" on single-family residential dwellings and townhouses); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 184, § 23C (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.239, .2395
(LexisNexis 2010) (covering both solar panels and small wind turbines); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 236.292 (West 2009) (covering both solar panels and small wind turbines). The Texas
and Illinois state legislatures recently considered enacting similar legislation to protect
solar panels. See Tracy Loew, Homeowners Fight to Go Green; Those Wanting to Install
Solar Panels are Often Blocked by Association Rules That Push Conformity, USA TODAY,

May 13, 2010, at A3 http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/2010-05-12green-conflictN.htm (describing bills in the legislatures of Texas and Illinois to limit the
power of homeowner associations to restrict solar panel installations and indicating that
eight states "passed or strengthened" such laws in 2008 or 2009 and eleven other states had
such laws prior to 2008).
'" $100,000 - $20,000 = $80,000. Of course, social benefits resulting from the
preemption of height restrictions in other local jurisdictions could offset the losses in
Beachtown. However, exempting the height restriction in Beachtown from the state's
preemption statute would have still increased the aggregate social welfare without
imposing any additional costs. An $80,000 deadweight loss would thus still exist and is
attributable to the imprecision of overbroad preemption.
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their degree of potential hardship to qualify for exemption and could engender
costly intergovernmental disputes over the issue.145
An all-or-nothing preemption approach also hinders efficient Tieboutian,
sorting among the citizenry. The famous Tiebout hypothesis suggests that
variations in local laws can increase social welfare by allowing citizens to "vote
with their feet" in selecting communities to reside in 'that best suit their own
respective preferences.14 6 Some citizens would undoubtedly be willing to pay a
premium to live away from the sight of renewable energy systems that they deem
aesthetically offensive. Others would gladly live in communities that accommodate
distributed renewables, particularly if given financial incentives to do so.1 4 7
Localized policymaking on these issues can enhance the social welfare by enabling
more citizens to reside in jurisdictions that regulate sustainable land use in ways
that mirror their individual preferences.
Efficiency arguments aside, state laws that broadly preempt local land use
restrictions on distributed renewables are probably politically infeasible in some

Legislators have utilized undue hardship provisions in other contexts, and such
provisions have sometimes generated debate over the degree of hardship requisite to trigger
145

exemption. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or
Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing, and Stigmatic Harms, 74 U. CHI. L.

REv. 1895, 1897-1904 (discussing interpretations of an undue hardship provision in the
Americans with Disabilities Act).
146
The Tiebout Hypothesis emphasizes the utility-maximizing benefits of
neighborhood differentiation, which enables citizens to seek out communities with
packages of tax, land use, and other policies that best suit their individual preferences. See
generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
419 (1956). Citing Tiebout, other commentators have similarly argued that policies
allowing communities to pay to avoid state-imposed land use obligations promote
efficiency by increasing the breadth of choices available to citizens in selecting a
community. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 35, at 506 ("A suburb should not be prohibited
from imposing elite standards for housing construction if it is willing to compensate those
injured by the standards.... The famous Tiebout Hypothesis suggests that differentiation
among suburbs enhances consumer satisfaction by making available a wider variety of

packages of public goods."). Of course, the Tiebout Hypothesis has also drawn its share of
criticism for some of its underlying assumptions, such as the perfect mobility of the
citizenry and perfect information. For a discussion of some common critiques of the
Tiebout Hypothesis, see Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 515-18

(1991).
147 Evidence of variation in citizen views regarding the aesthetics and other impacts of
renewable energy devices abounds. For descriptions of landowners with particularly strong
distaste for small turbines, see supra note 63. For an example of a landowner who
evidently prefers to live in a green-oriented community, see AM. WIND ENERGY Ass'N,
SMALL WIND FACTSHEETS: How Do SMALL WIND SYSTEMS AFFECT PROPERTY VALUES?

(undated) (describing landowners who "wanted to live in a neighborhood that was

concerned about the environment and loved the idea of being next door to a wind turbine").
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states. 14 8 Preemption statutes can provoke political hostility because they tend to
marginalize the distinct interests and characteristics of a state's communities and
fail to engage local governments in the policymaking process.' 49 Even where state
legislatures succeed in passing preemption laws, the laws could prove costly and

difficult to enforce amidst weak community support.'5 0
An ideal regulatory strategy would promote more efficient siting of
distributed renewables by allowing for consideration of the costs and preferences
unique to each community. Land use restrictions that exempt distributed
renewables may be welfare-maximizing in many localities, particularly where
aesthetics are of minimal concern. In communities such as Beachtown, however,
the aggregate costs to landowners and neighbors from accommodating distributed
renewables likely exceed the social benefits. The challenge lies in crafting
equitable, low-cost rules that lead to distributed renewables installations only in
"least-cost avoider" communities where accommodating the devices makes the
most economic sense.15 1
F. In Search of a Better Way

Recognizing the shortcomings of preemption and other strategies, legal
scholars have increasingly called for inventive new policies that motivate
communities to embrace sustainable land use without diminishing their regulatory
authority.152 Professor John Nolon recently advocated for more "reflexive" legal

148 Fischel

has expressed strong skepticism about the prospect of using preemptive
laws to prevent local land use policies from thwarting LULU projects. See FISCHEL, supra
note 25, at 206 ("The state government has the right to override local laws [to facilitate the
siting of a LULU], but in practice, such preemptive laws are hardly ever effective. Local
governments are simply too strong a force in most statehouses.").
149 Nolon has emphasized the risk of political backlash from attempting to preempt
local law in the name of sustainability. See John R. Nolon, Commentary, Climate Change
and Sustainable Development: The Questfor Green Communities, PLANNING & ENVTL. L.,
Oct. 2009, at 3, 6 (expressing concern that "a reawakened federal government might repeat
past mistakes of ignoring important local functions or violating critical norms and
triggering powerful opposition in its haste to create national solutions to the crisis of
climate change").
1is Id. at 9 (arguing that if certain proposed federal energy regulations are enacted,

"local governments will be forced to implement ambitious energy-efficiency code
standards or stand down and watch the Department of Energy attempt to achieve
compliance and to prosecute developers, owners, and sellers of buildings built in violation
of the national code").
151 A "least-cost avoider" is the party to a conflict that is able to most cheaply bear the
cost at issue. See Coase, supra note 99, at 31-34.
152 Nearly forty years ago, Bosselman and Callies famously advocated for more statelevel land use regulation to further environmental objectives. See BOSSELMAN & CALLIES,
supra note 22, at 1-4. Recently, Bronin made new calls for state involvement in land use
law to promote sustainability. See Bronin, supra note 18, at 231-35.
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regimes to promote sustainability,' 53 envisioning programs under which state or
federal funds are "allocated to those local governments most motivated to act to
support initiatives that suit local conditions and capacities."l 54 Professor Sara
Bronin has emphasized the need for states to "find innovative ways to preserve
both the environment and local autonomy."ss And Professor Patricia Salkin has
expressed similar sentiments, arguing that state governments must find ways to
"incentivize local action . .. and must be mindful of the importance of local buy-in
when developing state-level plans for sustainability."ss An optimal legal regime
would enable communities to internalize more of the outside gains associated with
allowing distributed renewables, draw upon the expertise and resources of state
governments, and leverage existing social norms in favor of sustainability.
These called-for solutions to community resistance could conceivably
originate at the state or federal level. Commentators seem divided as to whether the
federal government is better suited for the task. Federal regulation of renewable
energy-related land use would arguably be more equitable' 57 and would likely be
constitutional.' 8 In fact, one recent article advocates a system of federal and local
cooperation that would largely preclude state-level involvement.' 5 9 However, some
scholars have written resoundingly against federal involvement,' 6 0 arguing that
See Nolon, supra note 149, at 10. (arguing for a legal regime that would "call on
the full range of available state and local strategies, respect regional geographical and
economic differences, and benefit from the innovation that comes from state and local
experimentation").
153

154 id.
155

156

Bronin, supra note 18, at 272.
Salkin, supra note 141, at 259.

Federal government intervention is arguably fairer because many of the benefits of
distributed renewable energy accrue at the national or even global level. At least one
commentator has made a similar argument in the context of solar energy. See Stephen F.
Williams, Solar Access and PropertyRights: A Maverick Analysis, 11 CONN. L. REV. 430,
458 (1979) ("[I]t seems appropriate that the burden of the aid [to landowners installing
solar panels] be bome by the nation's taxpayers as a whole rather than by [neighbors]. This
argument is based on the equitable premise that the beneficiaries of a scheme should
157

normally bear its costs.").
158 For a straightforward discussion of the constitutionality of federal land use
regulation, see Bronin, supra note 18, at 261.
1
See Ashira Pelman Ostrow & Patricia E. Salkin, Cooperative Federalism and
Wind: A New Frameworkfor Achieving Sustainability, 37 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1049, 1089-91
(2009) (advocating a federal-local program analogous to the cell phone tower siting scheme
under the Telecommunications Act of 1996 to facilitate the siting of wind turbines). See
generally Pursley & Wiseman, supra note 11 (manuscript at 44) ("[M]ost of the

cooperative strategies that have been suggested involve federal-state cooperation and
suggest ways to enhance state government decisionmaking authority. . . . We instead

emphasize the importance of federal-local cooperation and argue that state authority
regarding land-energy rules is detrimental to the goal of fostering distributed renewables.").
160

Circo recently argued against the notion of a federal solution. See Circo, supra

note 56, at 771-73; see also Bronin, supra note 18, at 262 ("No serious scholar supports an
expanded role for the national government in traditional land use regulation . . . .").
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land use issues are distinctively local and are ill-suited for governance by a distant,
bureaucratic federal government.' 6 ' Regardless, federal legislation seems unlikely
in the near future.' 62 Thus, this Article evaluates state-level intervention, although
much of the analysis could apply to a federal approach as well.

IV. PROPERTY RULES, LIABILITY RULES, AND ENTITLEMENTS
TO REGULATE LAND USE

What policy approaches can best motivate communities to embrace
distributed' renewables without forfeiting the benefits of localized land use
decisionmaking? Programs that offer compensation to host communities are a
commonly advocated strategy for siting ordinary LULUs,16 3 and a similar approach
could increase support for distributed renewables in neighborhoods and towns.'6
Well-crafted compensation schemes can "spread the burden of LULUs without
compromising the efficiency or safety of the siting." 65 Of course, distributed
renewables differ from ordinary LULUs in several ways, so an effective
compensation-based approach would need to account for the unique issues
surrounding these devices.
A. Entitlement Theory and the Power to Regulate

The differences among potential compensation schemes for promoting local
acceptance of distributed renewables are clearer when viewed within Guido
Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed's familiar "Cathedral" model of property and
liability rules.16 6 Under Calabresi and Melamed's framework, tensions between
See, e.g., Bronin, supra note 18, at 262 ("Congress, ruling from Washington, D.C.,
has little understanding of the myriad site-specific issues considered by tens of thousands
of localities."). Bronin has further noted that state regulation allows more opportunities for
valuable policy experimentation. Id. at 272 (describing the "benefits of state-by-state
experimentation" in promoting sustainable land use that "could not occur at the federal
level").
162 A Congressional bill has been drafted to combat community opposition to green
energy devices, but the bill does not appear likely to pass anytime soon. See American
Clean Energy & Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). The bill
passed in the House in June of 2009, but a year later it had not yet reached the Senate floor.
Id. (as read for the second time and placed on the calendar, July 7, 2009).
163 Vicki Been has prepared an interesting summary of common compensation
161

programs for LULU siting. See Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals:Is It Time to
Pay Attention?, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787, 792-96 (1994).
' See Been, supra note 127, at 1040 (stating that "[c]ompensation schemes are
academics' favorite solutions to siting problems" for LULUs).
61 Id. at 1046.
166 Calabresi and Melamed first published their model in an article appearing in the
Harvard Law Review in 1972. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property
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state governments and communities over distributed renewables can be distilled
into conflicts over scarce "entitlements" to regulate the use of land 167
Disputes over distributed renewable energy development directly involve
individual landowners and their neighbors, but such development also raises
conflicts between communities and higher levels of government. State
governments increasingly seek to preempt local land use regulations that restrict
distributed renewables. 68 The scarce "entitlement" at the center of these
preemption statutes is the regulatory power to exclude or allow distributed
renewables within a community.' 69 Either localities are entitled to regulate land use
in ways that restrict distributed renewables, or states are entitled to invalidate local
land use restrictions to allow installation of the devices.
Applying Calabresi and Melamed's framework to analyze entitlement
allocation rules requires designating one of two competing parties or groups as the
"polluter" and the other as the "victim."170 States that force communities to
accommodate distributed renewables in their land use policies can be characterized
as "polluters" of community views and aesthetics.171 Communities adversely
affected by the state mandates are "victims."
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV.
1089, 1089 (1972).
167 Although entitlement theory may seem somewhat
attenuated in the case of zoning,
such a paradigm is not new. See FENNELL, supra note 93, at 69-72 (noting that Professor
"Robert Nelson aptly describes zoning as a set of collective property rights held by the
community" and proceeding to analyze zoning entitlements within Calabresi and
Melamed's model).
168 For greater discussion of the preemption approach, see supra text accompanying

notes 123-151.
169 Barron has written in detail about intergovernmental transfers of legal
"entitlements" to regulate in specified ways. See Barron,supra note 21, at 2367 (describing
how states' transfer to municipalities of three discrete "local legal entitlements" to regulate
land use influences policy efforts to combat suburban sprawl).
170 As Coase recognized, either party to a conflict could theoretically be labeled the
"victim." See Coase, supra note 99, at 2 (noting that conflicts between parties over a scarce
entitlement are inherently "reciprocal in nature"). Proceeding with analysis under Calabresi

and Melamed's model nonetheless requires "victim" and "polluter" designations. See Lee
Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1422 (2007) (noting that
Calabresi and Melamed's Model "framework subtly diverges from a Coasean notion of
reciprocity").
171 As mentioned above, designating the polluter and victim is invariably arbitrary
because either party can always be viewed as imposing harm on the other. See supra note
170. Such arbitrariness is doubled in the context of state-local conflicts over distributed
renewable energy. Assignment of polluter and victim can be viewed in two ways. First,
communities that refuse to accommodate green energy in their land use policies may be
classifiable as polluters because such communities consequently rely more heavily on
energy generated from pollution-emitting fossil fuels to meet their electricity needs.
Second, states that invalidate local land use restrictions to permit green energy
development arguably "pollute" neighborhoods by jeopardizing views, aesthetics, and the
quiet enjoyment of land with distributed renewable energy development. This second
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Once the entitlement, polluter and victim are identified, applying Calabresi
and Melamed's model generates a two-by-two diagram showing four possible
rules.172 Each rule initially allocates the entitlement to one of the two competing
parties and protects the entitlement with either a "property rule" or a "liability
rule."' 7 3 An entitlement has property rule protection if others can acquire it from its
holder only through a voluntary purchase transaction at a price acceptable to both
parties.174 In contrast, an entitlement has liability rule protection if parties other
than the entitlement holder can unilaterally acquire it by paying some
predetermined price. 75
Over the years, legal scholars have expanded the model's original set of four
basic rules.' 76 Professor Lee Fennell's research in this area seems particularly
useful in analyzing land use restrictions on distributed renewables. Professor
Fennell has built upon work by Professor Ian Ayres that incorporates the concept
assignment of the state as polluter seems more directly tied to the disputes at issue. Because
the polluter/victim desgination is arbitrary, this Article proceeds by treating state
governments as polluters and communities as victims.
172 For descriptions of the four conventional rules and application of Calabresi and
Melamed's model to two different renewable energy land use conflicts, see Troy A. Rule,
A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate Wind Rights, 46 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 207, 215-16 (2009) (applying Calabresi and Melamed's model to analyze
landowner disputes over wind turbine wake interference). See also Rule, supra note 85, at
859-60 (applying Calabresi and Melamed's model to analyze solar access conflicts).
173 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 166, at 1093; Lee Anne Fennell, Properties
of Concentration, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227, 1262 (2006) ("According to Calabresi and

Melamed, society must make two decisions about any given entitlement-which party will
be allocated the entitlement, and how the entitlement will be protected"); Rule, supra note
172, at 215; Rule, supra note 85, at 858.
174 See Rule, supra note 85, at 858; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 166, at
1092; Rule, supranote 172, at 215-16.
175 See sources cited supra note
174.
176 The volume of scholarship expanding upon Calabresi and Melamed's original
twoby-two diagram is too vast to fully catalog here and continues to grow. See, e.g., Ian Ayres
& J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and

Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 710-15 (1996) (exploring the concept of "first-order" and
"second-order" liability rules); Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L.
REV. 793, 795-800 (1998) (expanding the model to reflect the possibility of put options for
entitlement holders); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1399,
1433-50 (2005) (incorporating the concept of "entitlements subject to self-made options"
to further expand upon Calabresi and Melamed's model); Krier & Schwab, supra note 102,
at 470-75 (adding a "double reverse twist" rule); Saul Levmore, Unfying Remedies:
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Startling Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2149, 2171-73 (1997)
(expanding the set of possible remedies under the model); Frank I. Michelman, "There
Have to Be Four," 64 MD. L. REv. 136, 152-58 (2005) (describing rules that would protect
against encroachments upon a competing entitlement in "future iterations" of conflict with
damages rather than an injunction); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78
potential forms of
CORNELL L. REv. 822, 841-49 (1993) (describing fourteen
entitlements).
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17 8
of "put options"177 into the model to generate six possible rules rather than four.
79
Under their broader conception of the Cathedral model,1 liability rule protection
under Rules 2 and 4 creates "call options" 80 in favor of non-entitled parties. The
possibility of giving put options to initial entitlement holders generates Rules 5 and
6.181 Applying this expanded version of the model to the conflict at issue yields six
possible rules, delineated in figure 1.182

'7 A "put option" is an "option to sell" that gives the "option holder the choice of
whether to be paid a non-negotiated amount" in exchange for an entitlement. Ayres, supra
note 176, at 796.
178 See Lee Anne Fennell, Common Interest Tragedies, 98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 907, 96580 (2004). For Ayres's original description of the six-rule, option-based approach, see
Ayres, supra note 176, at 797-99.
1' It should be noted that Calabresi and Melamed acknowledged the possibility of
expanding their four-rule model to include put option-like rules allowing entitlement
holders to unilaterally sell entitlements to non-entitled parties. See Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 166, at 1122 n.62 (mentioning the possibility of a rule for a "voluntary seller
and compelled buyer" and the possibility of "eight rules rather than four").
180 See Ayres, supra note 176, at 796 (stating that a "call option is an option to buy"
and that "Rules 2 and 4 have just these 'call' qualities").
18 For a discussion and analysis of Rule 5 in the context of distributed renewables,
see infra text accompanying notes 210-215. Rule 6 is analyzed in note 205, infra.
182 Figure A is based on a table in Fennell, supra note 173, at 1263. Table 2 was
ultimately based on a table by Ayres. See id. at 1263 n. 114. See also Ayres, supra note 177,
at 798 tbl. 3.
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Figure 1.

Rule

1

2

The State
Holds

Communities
Hold

Effect on Distributed Renewable
Energy (DRE)

Entitlement
Protected by
a Property
Rule

Nothing

Communities cannot unreasonably
restrict DRE within their boundaries

Entitlement
Subject to a
Call Option

Call Option

Communities can choose to
(i) allow DRE or
(ii) restrict DRE and pay a tax or fee

Nothing

Entitlement
Protected by a
Property Rule

Communities can freely restrict DRE
within their boundaries

Call Option

Entitlement
Subject to a
Call Option

Communities can restrict DRE unless
the State compels them to allow DRE in
exchange for State grants or tax credits

Less Than
Nothing..3

Entitlement
Plus a Put
Option

Communities can choose to
(i) restrict DRE or
(ii) allow DRE in exchange for State
grants or tax credits.

Entitlement
Plus a Put
Option

Less Than
Nothing

Communities cannot restrict DRE
unless the State compels them to
purchase authority to restrict DRE by

3

4

5

6

paying a

special tax or fee

B. The Alienability ofLand Use Authority
Discussions regarding the purchase and sale of entitlements to government
authority are not new.' 84 It is true that some types of government regulatory power

Fennell, supra note 176, at 1447 n.188 ("Granting one party the entitlement plus a
put leaves the other party with 'less than zero' because the latter party not only lacks the
entitlement but is also exposed to the possibility of a forced purchase of the entitlement.
That liability leaves the party with 'less than nothing."' (citing Ayres, supra note 176, at
799)).
183
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are viewed as inalienable because permitting their free exchange could threaten
political stability or offend environmental justice.185 However, many governmental
regulatory powers are alienable to some degree. Most states have already
transferred many land use regulatory powers to municipalities under state zoning
enabling acts,18 and some such powers have been returned to states through
subsequent legislation.8 7 In appropriate circumstances, using property or liability
rules to allow intergovernmental transfers of regulatory entitlements can facilitate
Coasean bargains and promote the allocation of such entitlements to their highestvalued users.'88
Consider, for example, a state agency seeking to site an undesirable hazardous
waste facility. The state may theoretically possess the power to preempt local land
use laws and site the facility in any local jurisdiction of its choosing. Often,
however, political constraints may effectively preclude the state's use of
preemption, to successfully site the LULU. State agencies faced with these
constraints sometimes negotiate the payment of compensation to municipalities to
entice their voluntary acceptance of LULUs.18 9 In these contexts, the state operates
as though municipalities hold the scarce entitlement to regulate land use within
their boundaries and such entitlement is protected by a property rule.
When a state agency and local government reach agreement on a compensated
LULU siting, the municipality voluntarily sells a discrete portion of its land use
See, e.g., Lehavi, supra note 31, at 960-92; Erin Ryan, Federalism at the
Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in Tenth Amendment
Infrastructure,81 U. COLO. L. REv. 1, 25 (2010).
184

185 For example, environmental justice concerns are commonly cited in opposition to
compensation schemes for siting LULUs that may adversely affect the health or safety of
neighbors. See Been, supra note 127, at 1040. Calabresi and Melamed cited the
"widespread existence of moralisms" against certain types of entitlement transfers as a
possible justification for protecting an entitlement with an inalienability rule. Calabresi &
supra note 166, at 1123-24.
Melamed,
'86 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
187 Examples of state reclamations of discrete aspects of land use authority abound.
See NOLON, NEw GROUND, supra note 22, at 147 (describing the advent of "state
legislation protecting wetlands, coastal zones, and other environmentally sensitive areas,"
state laws "governing the siting of power plants, hazardous waste facilities, and other
structures," and state statutes drafted to "protect agriculture through the creation of
agriculture districts, or to require a state permit for large-scale development").
188 Ryan has argued the potential merits of viewing bargaining over government
authority within the Cathedral framework and of employing property rule or liability rule
approaches to promote more efficient allocations of authority among government entities.
See Ryan, supra note 184, at 25 ("[T]he uncertainties that pervade intergovernmental
bargaining indicate that it suffers even more acutely from the very private law bargaining
problems that Calabresi and Melamed urge are best resolved by the use of property and
liability rules.").
189 Extensive scholarly literature exists on the use of compensation to accomplish
LULU siting. For a description of some such possibilities, see, for example, Been, supra
note 163, at 792-95.
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regulatory authority to the state-an efficiency-promoting Coasean bargain. Such
bargaining induces information-sharing among the government entities involved
and helps to promote efficient allocations of the regulatory entitlements at issue.' 90
C. The Inadequacy of PropertyRule Approaches

Allocations of entitlements to restrict distributed renewables through land use
controls are presently governed in most states by Rules 1 and 3, the rigid, property
rule-like approaches critiqued in Part II above.1 91 A majority of those states have a
regime that resembles Rule 3-allowing communities to choose for themselves
whether to accommodate the devices in their ordinances and covenants.19 2 This
"hands-off' approach effectively assigns the regulatory entitlement to communities
and protects it with a property rule. Communities in Rule 3 states are free to
regulate land use inside their jurisdictions, even if their local ordinances deter or
prohibit landowners from installing renewable energy devices. 93
A Rule 3 approach gives communities wide discretion to structure renewable
energy-related land use policies in accordance with local interests and facilitates
Tieboutian sorting. However, it fails to address the externality problems that.have
led many communities to excessively restrict distributed renewables. For the
reasons set forth previously,' 9 4 communities tend to underconsider the regional,
national, or global benefits of distributed renewables when formulating land use
regulations and thus overrestrict their installation. Increasing calls for preemption
or other state or federal interventions cast serious doubt on the ability of a Rule 3
approach to support distributed renewable energy growth in the coming years.

190 The concept of a reverse auction or "low-bid auction" for LULU siting exemplifies
how least-cost or lower-cost avoiders may be identified through protecting a land use
authority entitlement with property rules. Under such schemes, "communities would
submit a sealed bid indicating the minimum amount they would need to host a facility."
Don Munton, The NIMBY Phenomenon and Approaches to FacilitySiting, in ELLICKSON &
BEEN, supra note 62, at 745.
191 Rule I corresponds to the subsection on preemption of local regulation. See supra
text accompanying notes 123-151. Rule 3 corresponds to the subsection on deference to

community governments. See supratext accompanying notes 93-106.
192 The only states falling outside this category are the ones with preemptive laws that
invalidate local regulations that restrict distributed renewables. For a list of many such
preemption statutes, see supra notes 130-137.
193 This characterization is concededly attenuated because in many cases states could
theoretically preempt local laws at any time. However, in the absence of such state
preemption statutes, Rule 3 seems to best describe the allocation of authority because
communities have long held the entitlement to regulate land use, there is no express
provision for the state's purchase of the entitlement, and state governments typically must
overcome significant political and procedural barriers to reclaim it.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 18-31.
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In contrast, statutes in a handful of states seem to embrace Rule 1, preempting
and invalidating local restrictions on distributed renewables.'9 5 Because
communities operating under such laws cannot unilaterally pay the state to avoid
preemption, these legal regimes assign the scarce regulatory entitlement to the state
government and protect it with a property rule.
A Rule 1 approach succeeds in causing communities to adopt land use
regulations that allow for distributed renewables, but it does so at the expense of
local involvement and flexibility and is thus prone to inefficiency. For example, in
the picturesque city of Beachtown, described earlier,196 the costs to residents of
allowing small wind turbine installations far exceeded those in more ordinary
communities where views and aesthetics were less valuable. A Rule 1-like statute
preempting local restrictions on distributed renewables nonetheless applies equally
to all types of communities, ignoring localized differences, preventing Tieboutian
sorting, and excluding local involvement from the policymaking process. 97
Moreover, the transaction costs associated with intergovernmental bargaining over
entitlements to regulate are often very high, so there is little chance of states
voluntarily selling the entitlements to communities under the rule. 198 In the face of
such obstacles, an appropriately tailored liability rule-like approach could motivate
community acceptance of distributed renewables while harnessing localized
information in ways that sustainability law scholars have been clamoring for.'9 9
19 A detailed discussion of states' use of preemption to overcome local barriers to
distributed renewables is set forth in Part III.E. See supra text accompanying notes
123-151.
196 See supratext accompanying notes 144-151.
197 A state could conceivably attempt to identify unique communities with particular
aesthetic sensitivities and exempt them from a broad preemption statute on efficiency
grounds. However, any such attempt would pit municipalities against each other in efforts
to obtain exemption and would also rely on state-level decisionmaking that failed to solicit
local input.
198 A community and state government operating under Rule 1 could theoretically
strike a voluntary bargain under which the community paid some negotiated amount to the
state in exchange for the entitlement to continue excluding distributed renewables. The
bargain could be implicit, such as a state's assessment of periodic fines for such
exclusionary policies with no threat of ever enjoining the community to change them. In
practice, however, communities rarely offer compensation to state governments to avoid
the preemption of local regulations. The probability of successful Coasean bargaining of
this sort would increase if a state enacted legislation expressly inviting it, but even then, the
likelihood of efficient entitlement transfers is significantly lower than under some of the
option-based approaches described below. See infra text accompanying notes 205-214; see
also Lehavi, supra note 31, at 957 (discussing the difficulties of interjurisdictional
bargaining over zoning entitlements).
199 Commentators have noted the ability of liability rule-based approaches to force
parties to share their true valuations of entitlements. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 176, at
1404. Scholars have also observed the unique ability of liability rules to strike a balance
between equity and efficiency. Richard R.W. Brooks, The Relative Burden ofDetermining

PropertyRules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral,97 Nw. U. L. REV.
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D. Communities as "Best Choosers"

Having determined that the two existing, property rule approaches to
promoting community acceptance of distributed renewables are inadequate, our
attention turns to the remaining four rules in figure 1. These four rules incorporate
option theory to allow greater flexibility in policymaking than is possible under
Rule 1 or Rule 3.
Selecting among the remaining four rules requires one to determine which
party is most likely to be the "best chooser." 200 The best chooser is the party "in the
best position to make the cost-benefit analysis" relating to a locality's
accommodation of distributed renewables.20 1 If one determines that state
governments are the best choosers, one would favor Rules 4 and 6, because those
rules empower states to compel a transfer of the regulatory entitlement at issue.
Conversely, if one determines that communities are the best choosers, Rules 2 and
5 are more attractive, because those rules give greater discretion regarding
distributed renewables to communities than to the state. The weight of recent
scholarship suggests that communities are the best choosers in this context because
they typically are in a better position than state officials to estimate the likely costs
of distributed renewables within their jurisdictions.
Most calls for innovative approaches to promoting sustainable land use
emphasize the need to harness valuable community-level information and
support. 202 It has also long been understood that communities that voluntarily
accept LULUs are less likely to oppose them than communities that have LULUs
thrust upon them.203 As Professor Fischel has noted, the consent of communities is
"best obtained by compensation offered in a system in which local governments
267, 308-09 (2002) ("When justice calls for one property rule and efficiency calls for
another, liability rules serve as useful compromises.").
200 "Best chooser" analysis is well established in the law and economics literature.
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,

81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) (advocating the use of rules that place liability on the party
who is "in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and
accident avoidance costs and to act on that decision once it is made" (emphasis omitted));
see also Krier & Schwab, supra note 102, at 470 ("All other things being equal, when
liability rules are used the party who is the best chooser should be confronted with the

decision whether or not to force a sale upon the other party" (citing Calabresi & Hirschoff,
supra)).
201

Calabresi & Hirschoff, supranote 200, at 1060.

202 See supra text
203

accompanying notes 152-153.

See, e.g., Been, supra note 163, at 791 ("Studies show that risks a community

assumes voluntarily are more likely to be accepted than those foisted upon a community.").
Of course, a community that agrees to adopt green energy-friendly land use policies in
exchange for compensation is arguably not "volunteering" at all, but is engaged in a
mutually consensual transaction. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING
COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND 117 (2007) ("A volunteer is someone
working for free, not someone who gets paid.").
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can decline to accept . .. Schemes that force communities to accept compensation
and unwanted [land uses] are apt to meet much more resistance." 2 04 Because
approaches based on Rules 4 and 6 fail in this regard, those rules seem ill-suited
for governing allocations of the regulatory entitlement at issue.205
E. Assigning the Entitlement

A presumption that communities are the best choosers in this context leaves
just two option-based rules remaining from our original six-rule diagram: Rule 2
and Rule 5. Rule 2 assigns the competing entitlement to the state, while Rule 5
assigns it to communities. Policies implementing either of these rules are appealing
in that both would motivate more localities to accommodate distributed renewables
while allowing each community to independently and locally decide the issue.
Valid arguments can be made for assigning the regulatory entitlement to the
state. Municipalities derive their land use regulatory authority from state
governments, and states often have the capacity to take it back or limit its scope,
which suggests that the entitlement ultimately rests with states.206 A Rule 2
approach embraces this perspective, but protects the states' entitlement with a
liability rule rather than a property rule. States applying Rule 2 would preempt
local land use restrictions on distributed renewables yet allow individual
204
205

FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 183.

State officials operating under a Rule 4 approach could conceivably identify

municipalities that they believed were best suited for distributed renewable energy
development, and compel them to adopt ordinances accommodating such development in
exchange for cash. Municipalities selected under the rule would be unable to opt out of
designation. Such an approach would contravene the goal of preserving local autonomy
and would risk invoking political backlash in communities that are singled out and
subjected to state mandates.
A legal regime implementing Rule 6 would seem even less appealing. In a state
applying a Rule 6 approach, if potential renewable energy productivity were greater in
certain windy or sunny regions of a state, the state government could unilaterally require
communities in those regions to adopt provisions accommodating green energy. More
aesthetically sensitive communities, or areas of the state with the lowest productivity

potential for distributed renewables, would pay additional taxes or fees and could freely
block renewable energy installations. A Rule 6 approach would require a presumption that
state governments were better able than local governments to discern where within their
state distributed renewable energy would be cost-justified. Given the doubtfulness of such
a presumption, it is difficult to conceive of a context warranting such a rule.
206 See Bronin, supra note 18, at 267-68 ("Through enabling acts relating to zoning
and design controls, states dictate how localities may regulate land use. States can expand
or contract localities' decision-making powers by amending these enabling acts or by
enacting unrelated legislation.").
State laws can similarly constrain private covenant-making to further legitimate state
interests. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing governments' power to
invalidate racially restrictive covenants and other offensive covenants in further of state
objectives).
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communities to unilaterally evade preemption by paying the state a predetermined
tax or fee. Communities whose expected damages from preemption exceeded the
amount of the tax or fee would pay the state and continue restricting renewables.
Communities whose expected damages were less than the tax or fee amount would
voluntarily accommodate distributed renewables in their land use policies to avoid
paying the state.
On the other hand, communities have historically possessed and exercised the
entitlement at issue. Municipalities in most states have regulated land use for
decades in ways that indirectly restrict distributed renewable energy.207 In those
jurisdictions, new legislation that effectively assigns the regulatory entitlement to
the state government could be perceived as a reassignment from communities to
the state. 208 A Rule 2 approach would require communities in those states to
choose between two unattractive options-having their land use controls
preempted or paying a new tax. Upsetting the current balance of land use
regulatory authority between state and local governments with such a strategy risks
provoking the same sort of political resistance that plagues Rule 1's rigid
preemption approach.209
A Rule 5-based strategy is less likely to incite political opposition than one
corresponding to Rule 2. Under a Rule 5 approach, communities would retain their
entitlement to restrict distributed renewables in their land use controls but would
also receive a put option enabling them to sell the entitlement to the state. If Rule 5
applied in Beachtown, 2 10 the state would not require that Beachtown pay a tax or
fee to protect its existing set of local land use controls against preemption. Instead,
the state would offer the city a statutorily-determined amount of cash or tax credits
to voluntarily revise its controls. 2 1 1 Beachtown could then make a localized
estimate of the likely costs of accommodating distributed renewables in its
municipal ordinances and weigh that estimate against the value of the state's
offered tax credit or grant to reach its own decision on the issue.
The cost of funding the state's tax credits or grants under a Rule 5 approach
would ultimately be shared throughout the state but would be less conspicuous
than a locally-funded tax payment to the state under Rule 2 and less likely to rouse

Put differently, most states presently operate under Rule 3, affording communities
the entitlement to regulate land use as it relates to distributed renewables. To review the
discussion on Rule 3, see supra text accompanying notes 192-194.
20s Calabresi and Melamed recognized the potential for significant distributional
impacts from the initial assignment of an entitlement. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 166, at 1098 ("Difficult as wealth distribution preferences are to analyze, it should be
obvious that they play a crucial role in the setting of entitlements.").
209 For a discussion of the political unpopularity of preemption, see supra notes
148-149.
210 See supra text accompanying notes
144-151.
211 Part V describes a tax credit scheme that would apply Rule 5. See
infra text
accompanying notes 238-250.
207
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212

A Rule 5 approach would portray a community's
political opposition.
accommodation of distributed renewables as a meritorious act,213 providing
financial rewards to localities that voluntarily undertake it. 214 For this reason, as at
least one commentator has noted, put option strategies like Rule 5 are often most
effective when used to "induce people to engage in socially valuable conduct." 2 15
F. Setting the Option Price

A strategy applying Rule 5 would require policymakers to confront the
difficult task of determining how to set the put option's exercise price.2 16 Who
should determine the amount communities should be eligible to receive from the
state for voluntarily accommodating distributed renewables in their land use laws?
Under ordinary liability rules, nonentitled parties hold options to acquire the
entitlement for a price that equals some third-party estimate of the entitlement's
value to its holder.2 17 Conventional liability rules can lead to inefficient entitlement
212

The distributional effects under a Rule 5 approach are arguably less likely to raise

opposition than would direct taxes because they involve the distribution of concentrated
benefits among Green Communities that are funded through modest increases in the
collective, diffusely-shared tax burden on the citizenry. For an introductory discussion of
the effects of concentrated benefits and diffuse costs, see generally MANCUR OLSON, JR.,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROuPs (1971).
213 Viewing the longstanding status quo of prohibiting distributed renewables as the
baseline, a locality's new commitment to allow these land uses to further statewide
objectives is arguably a meritorious or "supernormal" action worthy of compensation.
Ellickson and Fischel analogously applied a "supernormal" versus "subnormal" dichotomy
in the context of regulatory takings analysis, arguing that a governmental requirement of
"supernormal" development warrants just compensation, but a prohibition on offensive
"subnormal" development does not. See Fischel, supra note 65, at 897 ("As both [Robert]

Ellickson and I have argued, an appropriate focus for the regulatory takings doctrine is
local government regulation that imposes 'supernormal' standards on owners of
undeveloped land. Local controls that require developers to forego 'subnormal' (or
nuisance-like) development and conform to 'normal' standards for suburbs in their
situation do not require compensation." (footnotes omitted)).
214 Other scholars have suggested the possibility of compensation for hosting LULUs
being framed as a reward rather than as a remedy for the community's expected damages.
See Been, supra note 163, at 792 (citing DAVID MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN,

SITING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES LOCAL OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION

164-175 (1982)) (noting that compensation for accepting a LULU can be structured to
"serve as a remedy, a preventative measure, or a reward").
215 Fennell, supra note 176, at 1448.
216 Of course, this same challenge arises when structuring any compensatory scheme
for LULU siting. See Been, supra note 127, at 1042 (arguing that the "most important
hurdle" faced by compensatory schemes "is the difficulty of translating the risks of a
LULU into monetary terms").
217 See FENNELL, supra note 93, at 103 ("Liability rules have traditionally been
understood to involve a predetermined price, usually established by a third-party such as a
court or administrative agency.").
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transfers whenever third-party valuations of entitlements are too low. 2 18 Because
Rule 5-based approaches involve put options rather than call options, they can lead
to inefficiencies whenever such valuations are too high.2 19
Third-party valuations of entitlements are notoriously difficult and
imperfect. 22 0 The costs and benefits of distributed renewable energy development
are dynamic and widely diffused effects such as cleaner air, fewer greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere, and effects on energy prices-so estimating them is
challenging and costly. 2 2 1 Locating a noninterested third party capable of making
such valuations could also be particularly difficult given that both parties vying for
the entitlement are government entities.222

To illustrate the undervaluation problem associated with liability rules, suppose
that an entitlement holder (X) valued its entitlement at $1,000 and another party (Y) valued
the entitlement at $900. If the entitlement has liability rule protection and receives a thirdparty valuation of $850, Y would purchase the entitlement from X-its highest valued
user-for $850, generating a deadweight loss. For further discussion on
218

undercompensation problems under traditional liability rules, see generally Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited:
CriticalObservationsfrom BehavioralStudies, 80 TEX. L. REv. 219, 249-50 (2001).
219 This overvaluation problem is simple to demonstrate. Suppose that Y held an
entitlement, valuing it at $900. X valued the entitlement at $1000. If the entitlement
received a third-party valuation of $1100 and Rule 5 applied, X-the highest-valued user-

would be unwilling to pay that amount to acquire it and a deadweight loss would result.
scholars have discussed the inherent difficulties of third-party
220 Numerous
valuations of entitlements under liability rules. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 199, at 296-98
(discussing the administrative burden of third-party valuations under liability rules); Robert
Cooter & Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 CALIF. L. REv.

1432, 1480 (1985) (describing how excessively high judicial valuations of damages can
lead to overcompensation); Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 218, at 249-50 (noting that
excessively low valuations can lead to undercompensation problems under liability rules).
221 As far as costs go, each landowner within a community would potentially sufferto varying magnitudes-from the aesthetic and property value impacts of changing land

use restrictions to allow distributed renewables in the neighborhood. Some landowners
would end up seeing small wind turbines erected next door in affluent parts of town, while
others would perhaps experience no impact at all. Aggregating and attaching a dollar value
to these hundreds of unique landowner losses would be prohibitively complex and
expensive.
Free riding, holdout problems, and other collective action problems can often become

more severe as the number of stakeholders involved in a given transaction increases. For a
brief discussion of the positive correlation between the number of parties involved in
negotiations over an entitlement and the likely transaction costs associated with such
negotiations, see supra note 102 and accompanying text.
222 It is difficult to conceive of a federal entity that would handle such value
determinations and any state or local government entity designated to set the put option

exercise price would not be a third party.
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The entitlement valuation problems just described are avoidable under Rule 5
if the state government itself sets the option price.223 Professor Lee Fennell has
explored the possibility of using "entitlements subject to self-made options"
(ESSMOs) to overcome the challenge of complex entitlement valuations in the
context of call options. 22 4 An ESSMO "requires one party to package her
subjective valuation in the form of an option, while allowing the other party to act
unilaterally on that option." 22 5 In a Rule 5-like regime involving put options,
having option-makers set the exercise price affords benefits similar to those under
ESSMOs, sidestepping many of the valuation problems that plague ordinary
liability rules. 2 2 6 The state legislature's option pricing decisions would serve as a
proxy for the state's collective willingness to pay for land use policies that are
friendly towards distributed renewables within a given community. Municipalities
and subdivisions could then choose for themselves whether to unilaterally sell their
entitlements. Although such an approach would not perfectly address the negative
externality problems caused by distributed renewables, 227 it would be a relatively
low cost and politically acceptable means of improving upon existing laws.
G. Dividing Up the Compensation

Before moving on to practical applications of Rule 5, one important question
remains: if a community operating under the rule elects to sell its entitlement to
restrict distributed renewables to the state, who should ultimately receive the
compensation? Should municipal governments keep the funds, or should the
money be distributed to local citizens? Such a question commonly arises when
structuring any LULU compensation scheme.22 8
See

FENNELL, supra note 93, at 103 ("Liability rules have traditionally been
understood to involve a predetermined price, usually established by a third party such as a
court or administrative agency. But it is also possible to involve the parties themselves in
223

.
setting the prices .
224 Fennell, supra note 176, at 1401.
225 FENNELL, supra note 93, at
105.
226 See Fennell, supra note 176, at 1409 ("Option making offers an underexplored
way to tap into private valuations in multi-party interactions occurring over time and across
space."); see also FENNELL, supra note 93, at 105 ("[T]he ESSMO dodges the primary
sources of inefficiency associated with property rules and ordinary liability rules-holdout

problems and undercompensated transfers, respectively. It also avoids the need for [thirdparty] valuation.").
227 A perfect solution to the negative externality problem would compensate each
neighbor of a newly-installed distributed renewable energy device in an amount equal to
that neighbor's unique costs. Neighbors living adjacent to such devices would typically

receive greater compensation than those living a few hundred feet or a few blocks away. In
most cases, implementing a regime that sought to perfectly compensate neighbors on a
case-b -case basis would be prohibitively costly or impossible.
2 A common criticism of compensation schemes for the siting of LULUs is that it is
often not clear who should actually receive the compensation at issue. See Been, supra note
127, at 1044 ("Compensation mechanisms . .. raise difficult questions about who should
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A compelling argument can be made for distributing at least some of the
compensation directly to a community's landowners. Property owners hold
fragmented rights to exclude distributed renewables from the community under the
land use regulations at issue and would directly bear most of the financial losses
from a community's sale of those exclusion rights. 229 As described in Part V
below, 23 0 landowner compensation could be inexpensively distributed as tax
credits through a state's property tax system. 2 31 Local governments should
arguably also be eligible to receive some portion of the compensation paid to
communities that accommodate distributed renewables. City councils and county
commissions would undertake the process of amending local land use regulations
to effectuate the "sale" of their regulatory entitlement to the state and would be
more motivated to make room on their agendas for the issue if state grant funding
were at stake. Allocating some of the compensation directly to municipal
governments as a block grant might also foster greater local support among a
community's renters, who would receive only indirect benefits from the tax
credits.232
V. GREEN COMMUNITY TAx CREDITS

A state could create a compensatory scheme corresponding to Rule 5 by
enacting legislation that awarded modest property tax credits to landowners in
communities that voluntarily accommodated distributed renewables.23 3 Local
receive compensation: residents, property owners, the neighborhood itself, or some
combination of the three.").
229 The conception of zoning as a distribution of fragmented exclusion
rights to a
community's landowners has existed for decades. See supra note 12.
230 See infra text accompanying notes 234-253.
23 Laws in many jurisdictions already afford special designations to certain classes of
real property and provide for property tax credits or other forms of differential taxation
based on the designations. See, e.g., Tax Credit Programs & Exemption Information,
MD. DEP'T OF ASSESSMENTS AND TAx'N, available at http://www.dat.state.md.us/sdatweb/
taxcredits.html (last updated Aug. 31, 2010) (describing state-level tax exemptions or
credits in Maryland for agricultural use properties, religious or charitable use properties,
educational use properties, and other properties fitting other categories of specified uses).
232

Of course, renters could receive some indirect benefits from tax credits awarded to

their landlords. The proportion of a landlord's tax credit savings that it would pass along to
renters would depend on price elasticity of demand for rental housing in the jurisdiction.
See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 62, at 655-56. If there are ample close substitutes to
the jurisdiction's rental housing, then landlords would theoretically pass along more of the
savings to renters. For a general discussion of the incidence of taxes on real estate and
related topics, see id at 654-59 (discussing the incidence of taxes on land itself,
construction, and other land improvements).
233 A handful of states do not have state-level property taxes. See Karen Hube,
Property Taxes Soar to Close Budget Gaps, FISCAL TIMES (July 27, 2010),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Issues/Taxes/2010/07/27/Property-Taxes-Soar-to-CloseState-and-Local-Budget-Gaps.aspx (noting that only, thirty-seven states have a state-
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governments in communities qualifying for these "Green Community Tax Credits"
would also receive a one-time grant upon a showing that they had amended their
land use laws to welcome distributed renewable energy devices.
A Green Community Tax Credit program would not disturb communities'
long-held entitlement to restrict distributed renewables in their land use regulations
because no community would be forced to make any regulatory changes. At the
same time, the program would encourage communities to "sell" their entitlement to
the state by accommodating distributed renewables if they believed that the
aggregate value of the grant and tax credits offered exceeded the cost within their
jurisdictions.
A. Structuringthe Tax CreditProgram
A statute creating a Green Community Tax Credits program would likely

have an initial section describing the property tax credits available to landowners
within Green Communities. The section could also set forth a simple application
process for communities to obtain Green Community status and provide for
modest one-time grants to community governments that achieved it.234
The statute would also include model ordinance provisions and model
subdivision covenant amendment provisions for use by municipalities and private
neighborhoods to achieve Green Community status. The model ordinance and
subdivision covenant for obtaining Green Community designation would include
specific provisions that reasonably exempted solar panels and small turbines from
local land use restrictions.235 Parcels of land that were subject to private
subdivision covenants would qualify for the tax credits only upon the adoption of
amendments at both the municipal and subdivision levels.
The model documents might also require that local land use regulations
reasonably accommodate xeriscaping, clotheslines, or other green LULUs. 23 6 For
imposed real property tax). Tax credits could conceivably be structured to offset local
property taxes in those states. Concededly, administrative costs for implementing a tax
credit program would be greater in those jurisdictions because the state government would
need to reimburse municipalities for resulting reductions in their tax revenue.
234 To help account for the wide variation in size among localities, the statute could
provide for determination of the block grant amount on a sliding scale based on a
municipality's population.
235 Existing model ordinances of this type may be a useful starting point for drafters of
Green Community Tax Credit legislation. See, e.g., CITY OF SAN JOSE, CAL., ORDINANCE
No. 28320 (2008), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/planning/pdf/Ord28320.pdf
(exempting solar panels from certain municipal height restrictions and clarifying the extent
to which city land use regulations apply to solar panel installations); Merriam, supra note
72, at 308-12 (providing a model small wind turbine ordinance); RENEW Wis., SMALL
WIND ENERGY SYs. ORDINANCE (undated), http://www.renewwisconsin.org/wind/ToolboxZoning/Small%20Wind%2OSystem%2OModel%200rdinance%2012-06.pdf
236 See supra note 59. The program could even apply the more broad definition of
"sustainability" and also require the accommodation of a specified amount of affordable
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the reasons set forth above,237 however, the community's adoption of various
homevoter-favored or homevoter-neutral sustainability policies should be
optional. 2 38 The tax credit program's primary aim would be to motivate
communities to allow green LULUs-a homevoter-feared aspect of sustainable
land use policy.
B. SafeguardingAgainst StrategicAbuses

Tax credits are notoriously prone to strategic abuse, 23 9 and a system of Green
Community Tax Credits would not be immune to such problems. Careful
legislative drafting would be necessary to limit opportunistic behavior. For
instance, without proper safeguards, some communities might adopt local
ordinances friendly to distributed renewables and receive the one-time grant but
then deter actual installations through slow and costly permitting processes or
other means. A state could discourage such abuses by basing annual tax credit
amounts on the actual kilowatts of generating capacity of distributed renewables
installed during the previous year.240

housing. See Salkin, supra note 13, at 131-32 ("[T]he provision of an adequate supply of
affordable housing is central to the social equity component of sustainability.").
237 See supra Part
II.C.
238 Even if these other policies were optional, state-distributed materials relating
to a
Green Community Tax Credits program could include sample ordinances or covenant
amendment provisions to ease their adoption in communities that favor them. In states
where support for sustainability is particularly strong, the Green Community Tax Credit
statute could mildly encourage adoption of these other policies through a voluntary,
flexible minimum-point system comparable to the system for LEED certification, but
offering no additional tax credits. See Lo Baugh, supra note 53, at 26 (describing the
flexibility of the United States Green Building Council's point system for LEED
certification, under which points are awarded for various types of design elements or
materials and the owner of a building is "free to select whatever points best meet the
buildings need").
239 Examples of abuse of tax credits or other government incentives abound. See, e.g.,
David H. Hu, Seed CapitalIs Not Enough: Lessons from Hawaii's Attempt to Develop a

High-Technology Sector, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 401, 405-06 (2008) (describing abuses of
Hawaii's Act 221, under which the state issued more than $100 million in tax credits
between 2001 and 2003, but where only an estimated $70 million was "invested in start-up
companies intended to benefit from the program"); see also Anne L. Alstott, Work vs.
Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 965, 1031 (1999)

(describing the need for "complex rules to combat predictable abuses" of the basic tax
credit formula under a former New Jobs Tax Credit program).
240 For example, the statute could provide for a fixed tax credit amount per tax parcel
that is based upon the number of kilowatts of installed generating capacity of distributed
renewables within the community during the previous twelve-month period. County
officers could use inspection and permit records to generate and certify annual reports to
the state's department of revenue on new device installations for the state's use in

calculating tax credit amounts.
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The state legislation would also need to carefully define the scope of
communities and parcels that were eligible for tax credits. Credits should not be
available to owners of large agricultural or rural parcels that are not subject to
conventional zoning ordinances and would be unaffected by the regulatory
changes. Fortunately, many states already have land classification systems that
could help minimize the cost of identifying eligible parcels.
Even after a municipality adopted ordinances that allowed for distributed
renewables, state officials would still have to verify that no relevant private
covenants encumbered the parcels seeking Green Community designation. Title
insurers could conceivably reduce this administrative burden by investigating titles
to insure that the lots within applicant subdivisions were unencumbered by
covenants that would violate Green Community requirements.24 2
States would also need to adopt monitoring mechanisms to verify that statedesignated Green Communities continue to qualify for that status. County
recording offices could potentially assist by reporting any newly recorded
covenants relevant to a parcel's Green Community designation. Statutory
provisions could likewise require municipal governments to annually certify that
they had not adopted ordinances that might jeopardize their status as Green
Communities.
C. AdditionalAdvantages of a Tax CreditApproach
A Green Community Tax Credit program would accelerate the adoption of
local land use policies that facilitate distributed renewable energy development. It
would also be relatively invulnerable to political resistance, allow greater
Tieboutian sorting among the citizenry, and ensure that unique local costs received
adequate attention in the decision-making process.24 3 Although it would be far
from perfect, 2 44 a tax credit approach would respect local autonomy while
strengthening the incentive for communities to amend their regulations when
socially optimal to do so. The following are two additional benefits of using tax
credits in this context.
See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-53-030(5) (2010) (setting forth rules for land
use classification by counties in Washington for use in the stratification of the real property
assessment rolls).
242 Title insurers routinely search title records and issue policies insuring
against
specific title risks. See generally BARLOw BURKE, LAW OF TITLE INSURANCE § 1.02 (3d ed.
2003) (providing general information about the title insurance industry).
243 Of course, political barriers to small-scale renewable energy siting will
still exist in
some cases. For instance, local utilities sometimes oppose renewable energy. See, e.g.,
Burleson, supra note 61, at 143-44 (describing the resistance of utilities to renewable
energy development based on their perception that it competes with the utilities'
established markets).
244 In the words of Vicki Been on ordinary LULU siting, "while compensation may
not be sufficient to resolve siting impasses, it can't hurt, and indeed may be one of several
necessary elements of a solution." Been, supra note 163, at 824.
241
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1. Promotion ofSustainabilityNorms

A system of Green Community Tax Credits would leverage the power of
social norms in support of sustainability. Sustainability has enjoyed an increasingly
prominent role in popular culture in recent years, and some landowners have even
come to view distributed renewables as an "environmental fashion statement." 24 5
Such positive social norms are indispensable to the sustainability movement,
enabling producers of distributed renewables to achieve greater economies of scale
and persuading more citizens to go green.
Although recent studies suggest that landowners' resistance to renewable
24
energy development is decreasing,246 many landowners still fear the potential
impacts of distributed renewables on their neighborhoods. A Green Community
Tax Credit system would give public recognition to participating "Green
Communities," put pressure on other localities to accommodate distributed
renewables, and help to mitigate landowner concerns regarding the devices.247
For similar reasons, a Green Community Tax Credit program could also
reduce opposition from individual neighbors in neighborhoods with Green
Community status by strengthening intra-community norms in favor of distributed
renewables. A landowner whose city council or homeowner association has
already officially adopted "Green Community" policies, and who is receiving
consequent tax benefits, is relatively less likely to actively oppose a neighbor's
proposed wind turbine or solar panel.
2. PreservationofEnvironmentalJustice

A Green Community Tax Credit system has far less propensity to offend
environmental justice proponents than compensatory siting schemes for hazardous
waste sites or other LULUs that impact neighbors' safety or health. Advocates of
environmental justice have long argued against compensation-based LULU siting
regimes on fairness grounds. They contend that such regimes take unfair advantage
of poorer communities, which are more likely than wealthy communities to
245

Kate Galbraith, Assessing the Value of Small Wind Turbines, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
4,

2008, at Cl. The same article describes a proposal by New York Mayor Michael R.
Bloomberg to put small wind turbines "on the city's skyscrapers and bridges." Id.
246 See, e.g., Christopher W. Fry, Harvesting the Sky: An Analysis of National and
International Wind Power, 19 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL L. & POL'Y 427, 457 (2008) (citing

public opinion poll results as evidence of "decreasing resistance to wind development" in
the United States).
247 One pair of commentators has labeled early adopters of renewable energy
technologies and policies as "energy entrepreneurs," emphasizing their importance to the
growth of distributed renewable energy at the local level. See Pursley & Wiseman, supra
note 11 (manuscript at 50-51) ("Local governments' endorsement of renewables may help
overcome individuals' worries about and distrust of new energy technologies by adding a
'stamp of approval' that people trust.").
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willingly accommodate hazardous LULUs, such as waste disposal sites, in return
248
for compensation.
Neighborhood opposition to distributed renewables seems driven primarily by
fears of adverse impacts on a community's aesthetic ambiance or on property
values. So long as communities enforce reasonable safety-based regulations for
solar panels and small turbine siting, the health and safety-based arguments that
characterize the environmental justice movement lose their persuasiveness when
applied to distributed renewable energy devices.
The other common environmental justice argument against compensationbased LULU siting is that, under such regimes, LULUs ultimately end up in the
poorest communities who are in greatest need of the compensation. 2 49 Such
arguments have merit in discussions over the siting of a hazardous or noxious
LULU, but are inapplicable when the LULUs are renewable energy devices. 250
Indeed, shiny new solar panels and small wind turbines might actually help to
revitalize the image of some deteriorating or blighted areas where there has long
been a dearth of new development. Empirical researchers have found that the
positive property value effects of community gardens are often magnified when the
gardens are sited in poorer neighborhoods.25 1
Green Community Tax Credits would arguably be a progressive taxation
strategy, tending to redistribute wealth to less affluent communities. On average,
wealthier neighborhoods and towns tend to impose greater land use restrictions
than their less-affluent counterparts, suggesting greater price-sensitivity to
aesthetics. 25 2 Thus, high-end communities like Beachtown2 53 would be
comparatively less likely to voluntarily accommodate distributed renewables in
exchange for tax credits. More modest localities would be more likely to seek
Green Community designation to obtain the accompanying tax credits and would
ultimately pay a lower property tax rate than their wealthier counterparts. 254 In the
For a discussion and critique of environmental justice-based opposition to
compensatory LULU siting schemes, see Been, supra note 127, at 1040-41.
249 See Been, supra note 163, at 824 ("[I]t is likely that the communities that accept
248

LULUs under compensated siting programs will be our poorest communities. . . . The

distributional consequences of compensated siting programs therefore raise fundamental
questions about our treatment of the poor .. .
250 For an analysis of fairness issues in LULU siting, see Been, supra note 127, at
1027-76.
251 See Voicu & Been, supra note 50,
at 243.
252 See, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 62, at
28 (citing Stephen Malpezzi,
Housing Prices, Externalities, and Regulation in Metropolitan Areas, 7 J. HOUSING RES.
209 (1996)) (finding a positive correlation between the level of local land use regulation

and market prices of housing).
253 A description of the fictional city of Beachtown is set forth in Part III.E. See supra
note 144 and accompanying text.
254

One could argue that low-income citizens 'are unable to afford distributed

renewables and that installations (and resulting community-level tax credits) would be out
of reach. Although the affordability of distributed renewables has long been of concern,

power purchase agreements, energy finance districts, leasing arrangements, and similar
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end, the residents of luxury communities would thus bear a greater proportion of
the state's property tax burden under the tax credit program.
VI. CONCLUSION

As the popularity of small wind turbines and solar panels continues to grow,
neighborhood conflicts over the devices will become increasingly common.
Despite state and federal programs that aggressively encourage landowners to
invest in distributed renewable energy systems, local land use laws often deter
their installation. A growing number of states have enacted statutes that
sweepingly invalidate land use restrictions on distributed renewables. These broadbrush preemption laws tear down local barriers to installing the devices, but they
also undermine communities' land use authority and inefficiently ignore local
issues and concerns.
Characterizing land use regulatory power as an alienable entitlement within
Calabresi and Melamed's Cathedral model offers a new perspective on the debate
over how to promote sustainable development at the local level. It revealed an
option-based policy approach that could promote more efficient allocations of land
use regulatory authority related to distributed renewables between states and
communities. A state could apply the approach by offering modest property tax
credits to landowners in communities that elect to accommodate distributed
renewables in their land use controls. Such a system would incentivize more
neighborhoods to remove restrictions on renewable energy devices, yet allow each
community to decide the issue for itself, preserving the benefits of localized land
use decisionmaking.
Sustainable development continues to generate new and complex policy
challenges. Applying the tools of law and economics to analyze these emerging
issues helps to unveil the solutions needed to sustain the sustainability movement
for generations to come.

programs are beginning to overcome cost barriers. See, e.g., Bruce Allen, Leasing
America's

Rooftops

for

Solar

Energy,

MILLER-MCCUNE

(Jan.

27,

2009),

http://www.miller-mccune.com/business-economics/leasing-america-s-rooftops-for-solarenergy-3987/# (describing the growing popularity of solar rooftop leasing, solar power
purchase agreements, and solar energy finance districts as a means of making solar power
installations more affordable for private landowners).
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